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HAS THE U.S. SUPREME COURT FINALLY DRAINED
THE SWAMP OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE?:
THE IMPACT OF LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA
COASTAL COUNCIL ON WETLANDS AND COASTAL
BARRIER BEACHES
Hope M. Babcock*

Law is the foundation on which property rests and is, therefore,
the formal expression of a community's relationship to nature. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars
the government from "taking" private property for public use without just compensation.2 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment thus acts as a restraint on the government's use of its "police
power" authority to appropriate and regulate private property, and
functions as an important screen protecting individual liberty from
governmental intrusions.3 The language of the Takings Clause appears clear and deceptively simple, but applying that language has
proven to be extremely troublesome for the U.S. Supreme Court.4

* Professor Babcock is currently a Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. She was general counsel to the National Audubon Society from 1987 to
1991 and has also served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary-Energy and Minerals at the
U.S. Department of Interior. Professor Babcock was of counsel to a consortium of
environmental organizations and coastal towns on an amicus curiae brief filed with the
U.S. Supreme Court in the case that is the focus of this Article-Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council. Thanks are owed to Peter Byrne, Richard Diamond, Richard Chused, and
others on the Georgetown law faculty for their comments on an earlier version of this
Article.
1. William J. Cronon, Kennecott Journey, in UNDER AN OPEN SKY: RETHINKING
AMERICA'S WESTERN PAST 43 (William J. Cronon et al. eds., ·1992).
2. The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. For somewhat contrasting views of the role of property as a protector of all other
constitutional rights, see Carol M. Rose~ The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 238 (1993) (reviewing James
W. Ely, Jr., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992) and Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right,
29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Property]).
4. For some examples of critical commentary on the muddle of the modem takings
1
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In 1991, attention focused on a pending challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute preventing beachfront property owners from developing their land and on whether the Supreme Court
might use the case to clarify the takings doctrine. 5 This Article will
not address the question of whether the Court in fact clarified
takings law in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 6 It will
focus only tangentially on the vociferously debated question of the
extent to which the decision has chang~d the regulatory takings
doctrine first announced by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon. 1 This discussion focuses on the Lucas decision's
doctrine, see Frank L. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of the "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967);
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 51 S. CAL.
L. REv. 561 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 14 YALE L.J. 36 (1964)
[hereinafter Sax, Takings]; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-Hockery: A Comment on
Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697 (1988). For a concise, well-structured view of the
takings doctrine, see Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New
Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 51 TENN. L. REv. 577 (1990) (arguing
that property and its regulation are aligned in overlapping evolutionary relationships)
[hereinafter Rose, Property Rights]. For a fresh perspective on takings jurispruden'ce, see
Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993) (re-animating phrase "for public use"
as better yardstick for determining when compensation is required) [hereinafter Rubenfeld,
Usings].
5. The Court granted review of several property cases in the 1991 Term, but only
Lucas resulted in a major discussion of the takings doctrine as it relates to this Article.
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (holding that mobile home rent
control law was not physical taking of landowner's property); PFZ Properties, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that agency did not violate substantive
due process under § 1983 when it refused to process company's construction drawings),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991) , cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992). The Court
denied certiorari in Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991) (affirming that city ordinance conditioning nonresidential building permit on payment of fee to offset burdens caused by low income workers does not effect taking), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
6. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For some examples of commentaries maintaining that the
Court muddied the takings doctrine in the Lucas decision, see William W. Fisher III, The
Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1993) (criticizing majority opinion for, among
other things, incorporating nuisance doctrine into takings jurisprudence); Richard A.
Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993) (stating that Lucas addresses small universe of takings cases,
does not deal with partial or temporary restrictions on land use, and backs off strict per
se rule); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 955 (1993) (stating that
substantive opinions cannot break free of implicit assumption that any coherent account
of Takings Clause must allow political processes of land use planning and of economic
regulation to proceed) [hereinafter Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins]. See also Daniel A. Farber,
Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279 (1992) (stating that
Lucas rule does not identify regulations that are functionally equivalent to government
land acquisitions). For the view that Lucas brought much-needed and long-awaited
guidance on the topic, see Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and
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reliance on the common law to provide a set of guidelines by
which the constitutionality of governmental exercise of regulatory
authority can be measured.8 Much .has been written about the Lucas
Court's reliance on the common law of nuisance as an exception
to the rule that real property owners must be compensated when
all economically b~ne:Qcial use of their property has been extinguished.9 This Article, however, concentrates on the Court's reference to "background principles of the State's law of property" as
a rationale for compensation. Specifically, the Article examines the
effect of the Lucas Court's infusion of common law property doctrines into the takings debate over environmental regulations, focusing in particular on regulations protecting wetlands and coastal
barrier beaches. The starting point of the Article is the following
excerpt from the Court's opinion:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land
of all economically beneficial use, . . . it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of
the owner's estate shows tha.t t4e proscribed use interests were
not part of his title to begin with, 1o

This Article argues that the Court's reliance on the law of
property neither creates an internal inconsistency in takings law
nor necessarily leads to further destruction of natural resources.
Background principles of property law, such as custom and public
trust, have long provided a basis for government protection of the
public's interest in certain types of land, like the barrier beach
David Lucas sought to develop. 11
Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 Mn. L. REV. 162 (1993). And for
the opinion that the decision will have little if any effect on the constitutionality of
environmental regulations, see Glenn P. Sugarneli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing,
12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 439 (1993) [hereinafter Sugarneli, Sound and Fury].
8. One takings scholar refers to these common law doctrines as a "title penumbra."
David J. McCarthy, Jr., Ruminations on Regulation and the Takings Clause, 5 HOME RuLE
& CIVIL Soc'y 27, 63 (1994).
9. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings
Clause, 18 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Humbach, Nuisance].
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
11. Carol Rose takes this argument one step further, arguing that the concept of
property includes "a normative 'deep structure'" that includes qualities of restraint and
responsibility which form the basis of a sound environmental ethic. See Carol M. Rose,
Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1,
28 (1994) [hereinafter Rose, Environmental Ethics]; see also infra part III.B.
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Thus, the Lucas case need not be perceived as casting a constitutional cloud over laws protecting important ecosystems like
wetlands and barrier beaches. 12 The decision may not place these
resources in greater danger from property rights zealots and the
courts than the resources were before Lucas. 13 By allowing the
government to rely on background principles of common law to
justify regulatory action, the Supreme Court has conceptually expanded the "harmful" or "noxious uses" principle of takings jurisprudence, 14 giving the principle new vitality. Those who view Lucas as a cataclysmic decision for environmental regulation 15 may
be in danger of reading too much into the creation of a new
categorical rule based on economic value and too little into the
exceptions to that rule. 16
12. Notwithstanding this argument that Lucas should not severely restrain federal
and state regulators from pursuing policies that protect important natural resources like
wetlands, the resolution of questions left open after Lucas by the Court of Federal Claims
may well chill such initiatives. The rhetoric of the majority's language, the palpable
distrust of state legislators and regulators, and the obvious effort in the majority's decision
to let Lucas win all send strong pro-property rights signals to the lower courts. The
ultimate application of the Lucas doctrine by the lower courts may be more significant for
the protection of natural resources.
The Supreme Court has shown some initial reluctance to review post-Lucas takings
claims on the merits. See Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 499-502 (discussing
this and other post-Lucas cases of interest). But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994) (holding conditioned approval of permit to expand business in floodplain,
which required landowner to dedicate public greenway and pedestrian/bicycle pathway,
unconstitutional as uncompensated taking). In Dolan, the Supreme Court refined the
Nol/an nexus test to require individualized determinations of "rough proportionality"
between the regulatory exaction and proposed development's impact.
13. For an interesting discussion of the ascension of the takings issue on the
political conservative agenda and how the majority's decision was intended to promote
that agenda, see Richard Lazarus, Putting the Correct 'Spin' on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. Rnv.
1411 (1993) [hereinafter Lazarus, Spin]. See also Kenneth Berlin, Just Compensation
Clause and the Workings of Government: The Threat from the Supreme Court and Possible
Responses, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 97 (1993) (describing efforts by activist conservative
legal scholars to use property rights as cornerstone of their attack on activist government)
[hereinafter Berlin, Just Compensation]; Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 442
(stating that pro-takings advocates are using takings as back-door administrative, legislative, and judicial attacks on laws and regulations that cannot be repealed or modified on
their merits).
14. For a contrary view, see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9 (arguing that, after
Lucas, remedial statutes meant to improve common law could still be subject to preemption by common law is extraordinary reversal of centuries-old roles).
15. In the words of Justice Blackmun, "Today the Court launches a missile to kill
a mouse." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun protested the
decision as well as "each step taken to reach it." /d.
16. For a contrary view on the significance of the Court's linking of takings
jurisprudence to the common law of nuisance, see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at
23-28. Professor Humbach argues, among other things, that Lucas' shift of the locus for
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The remainder of this Article lays out the support for this
thesis. Part II summarizes the regulatory takings doctrine and the
nuisance principle and outlines both the facts of the Lucas case
and the Supreme Court's decision. Part III examines the common
law doctrines of custom and public trust and how, as "background
principles" of the law of property, they fit within the exception to
the bright line takings rule created by the Lucas Court. The analysis reveals the vitality and elasticity of these doctrines in state law,
and how, rather than acting as a limit on state regulatory authority,
they may enable proscriptive regulatory initiatives, such as those
protecting wetlands and coastal barrier beaches. Part III concludes
with a discussion of the applicability of these two common law
doctrines to barrier beaches and wetlands, drawing theoretical support from the work of Carol Rose on "inherently public property." 17
Part IV shows how public trust and custom can defeat a takings claim and explains that this should not destabilize expectations about property rights. This Article argues that these doctr~nes
not only accord with public expectations about the use of barrier
beaches and wetlands, but also help these lands to fulfill certain
important societal and ecological functions thwarted by current
understandings of regulatory takings doctrine. Nonetheless, a theoretical understanding of the public's superior interest in land protected by the doctrines of public trust and custom may founder on
the reality of the landowner's justifiable frustration when her expectations about the use of her land are not in accord with public
expectations based on obscure doctrinal principles. In fact, by infusing common law doctrines capable of evolution into the regulatory takings formula, the Lucas court has increased the opportunities for government to frustrate the expectations of private landowners.
Thus, the Article concludes by cautioning that over-use or misapplication of the common law doctrines of custom and public trust
could jeopardize both these doctrines and the environmental laws
they help support.

determining society's tolerance for a given proposed use of land from the legislature to
the courts is inherently undemocratic and, therefore, wrong.
17. Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy of the
Commons].
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REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE THROUGH LUCAS

The American commitment to property has been "an extremely
durable ... ideology," 18 stemming in large part from 1ohn Locke's
seventeenth-century discourse on the origin and nature of civil
governments. 19 .Property has been assigned many roles in American
society.20 A chief exponent of the sanctity of private property rights,
Richard Epstein, has argued that property rights are a fundamental
civil right because of their universality and utility. 21 This cry has
been taken up by property rights activists, who now seek to use
the takings doctrine to strike down government regulations deM
signed to protect critical natural areas, such as wetlands, coastal
barrier beaches, and habitats for endangered species. 22
18. Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of
Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSP. IN AM. HIST. 331-32 (1971), quoted in
MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789-1920 20 (1987).
19. John Locke, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
ToLERATION (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1937) was written between 1685 and 1688.
According to Selvin and other scholars, Locke's treatise served as the "reference point for
nineteenth century judicial discourse on the sanctity of private property and on the extent
of permissible governmental interference with the enjoyment of that property." SELVIN,
supra note 18, at 20. Another oft-cited reference point is Blackstone's CoMMENTARIES.
For example:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2, quoted in Robert C. Ellickson, Property in
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317 (1993).
20. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)
(advocating creation of property rights to protect intangibles like government entitlements); see also J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. CoMMENTARY 239 (1990)
(propounding green theory of property to give legal effect to ecological land ethic and to
support regulatory program of land use serving ecological ends of removing impediments
to exercise of public control).
21. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 207 ("Given where we are today, we need
less government and wider spheres of individual autonomy"). But see Carol Rose's
response to those who question whether the property rights approach enhances the cause
of individual autonomy, equality and liberty. Rose, Property Rights, supra note 4, at 593
(claiming property rights approach based on private rights system could result in restrictions on land use which could jeopardize some elements of autonomy, equality, and
liberty).
22. See Berlin, Just Compensation, supra note 13, at 99 (discussing how conservative ideologues have invoked the Just Compensation Clause as cornerstone of their attack
on activist government); see also Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 442.
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A. A Snapshot of the High- (Low-) Lights of Takings Law
Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, takings claims
consisted largely of allegations that the government had taken physical possession of private property through the exercise of its eminent domain power. 23 The general rule was that no compensation
need be paid unless the government formally appropriated the property, or, at the very least, seized possession of it. 24 Between 1871
and 1922, the application of the takings doctrine radically changed.
During that period, the Supreme Court handed down three decisions that became the foundation of the modem takings doctrine
and moved the emphasis away from the requirement of physical
possession of property by the government.
The first case to move the takings doctrine beyond its early
confines was Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 25 In Pumpelly, the Supreme Court held that a landowner was entitled to compensation
when his property was physically invaded by water, earth, and sand
as a result of the construction of a state-authorized dam by an
upstream property owner. Although the Court used language which
presaged more modem cases involving diminution of economic
value, 26 the case has been viewed as establishing the physical occupation rule in takings law. This rule states that where there has
been permanent physical occupation of land, the government must
compensate the landowner, even if the land has not been nominally
taken or appropriated.27 Courts considered physical invasion as a
23. According to some scholars, "[t]he most historically settled application of the
Just Compensation Clause-indeed perhaps the only historically settled application-is the
requirement that government must pay for property it seizes through an exercise of eminent
domain." Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 4, at 1081. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 49-52
.
(discussing the exercise of eminent domain power in the 19th century).
24. See Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 4, at 1083. See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892
(citing Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871)); Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897)
for the same proposition.
25. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). "It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory
result . . . if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property . . . .
[I]t can destroy its value entirely ... without making any compensation, because, in the
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use." Id. at 177-78. For other
early examples of the regulatory takings doctrine, see Washburn, supra note 7, at 165-66 n.22.
26. "[W]here real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water,
earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the
Constitution ...." Pumpelly, SO U.S. (13 Wall.) at 181 (emphasis added).
27. For a discussion of the difference between physical occupation cases, such as
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per se compensable taking. 28 Under this rule, the amount of land
physically displaced by the government's actions need not be large. 29
The second foundational case in this period was Mugler v.
Kansas, 30 in which the Supreme Court held that the owner of a
brewery was not entitled to compensation for a state law prohibiting him from manufacturing or selling alcohol. The plaintiff relied
on Pumpelly to argue that the statute destroyed his beneficial use
of the brewery property. 31 The Court brushed aside this argument,
not on the traditional ground that Mugler had suffered no invasion
of his land, 32 but because the sole basis of the prohibition law was
to protect individuals from harm. 33 Private property, the Court stated,
is "held under the implied obligation-that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community."34
Mugler introduced the "harmful" or "noxious use" principle,
also referred to as the "nuisance exception" to the Just Compensation Clause. 35 This principle sustains government actions designed
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding state law
requiring building owners to allow cable companies to place cable facilities in their
buildings per se taking of private property) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946) (holding physical interference with air space surrounding property equivalent to
occupying landowner's property), and physical invasion cases like Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding that imposition of navigational servitude on landowner's property for public access was compensable taking), see Alison Rieser, Public
Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REv. 5, 14-21 (1990) [hereinafter
Rieser, Public Trust]. In the latter category of cases, according to Rieser, the courts balance
public against private interests, as opposed to finding a per se taking. See id. at 14-15.
28. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. Per se categorical treatment entitles a landowner
to automatic compensation once he or she has shown that the case fits into the category.
It also relieves the court from examining on a case by case basis the legitimacy of the
public interest being advanced in support of the restriction. Jd.
29. In Loretto, the Supreme Court found displacement of a cubic foot of space on
the roof of the complainant's building sufficient to hold that a New York statute requiring
landlords to permit cable companies to install their equipment in rental apartments effected
an uncompensated taking. The Court stated that "whether the installation is a taking does
not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a breadbox." 458
U.S. at 438 n.16.
30. 123 u.s. 623 (1887).
31. Jd. at 667.
32. In Mugler, the plaintiffs argued that regulatory initiatives that destroy the value
of property require compensation. However, the Supreme Court distinguished Mugler from
Pumpe/ly by describing Pumpe/ly as involving a "permanent ... physical invasion" and
a "practical ouster of ... possession." Jd. at 668 (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago,
99 u.s. 635, 642 (1878)).
33. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668.
34. Jd. at 665.
35. While Lucas diminishes the significance of the Mug/er line of cases by labelling
the nuisance principle "simply the progenitor" of more contemporary statements about
requiring land-use regulations to advance a legitimate state interest in order to justify a
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to protect the public from harm regardless of the extent of interference with the landowner's use of his property. After Mugler and
until Lucas, the nuisance principle had been applied repeatedly to
sustain a wide variety of regulations, including some that physically invaded a landowner's property36 and others that severely
restricted the property's use. 37 The Supreme Court has also applied
the principle to activities that might in and of themselves not be
considered noxious, but fail the public nuisance test because of the
particular location in which they occur. 38 The analysis by the reviewing court in these cases was no more searching than was
necessary to find a harm-preventing justification for the restriction.39

taking, it does not completely reject those cases. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. The Court's
failure to reconcile the historic conflict between Mugler and the economic diminution test
has drawn from one takings scholar the criticism that it was "spinning" the Lucas opinion
"with the hope that lower courts will mistake the promise for the delivery and adopt its
broad language rather than its narrow holding." Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1413.
36. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (holding that destruction of
cedar trees that posed threat to nearby orchard is not compensable taking).
37. See, e.g., Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827)
(holding ordinance barring burials in certain parts of city constitutional); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding legislation prohibiting manufacture of
oleomargarine despite allegation of complete economic deprivation); Reiman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (holding that ordinance forbidding operation of livery
stable in downtown area does not effect compensable taking); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915) (sustaining ordinance forbidding operation of brickyard in residential
area); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding regulation closing
an operating gravel pit); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (sustaining
disclosure of confidential data even when company is deprived of all property interests in
its trade secrets). See also the denial of certiorari in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (upholding lower court ruling, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 893 (Cal.App. 1989), that applied the nuisance principle to sustain floodplain
ordinance causing landowner total economic loss). The majority opinion in Lucas, therefore, errs when it says that it could find no case that employed the harmful use prevention
logic to sustain a regulation that wholly eliminated the value of a claimant's land. Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2899. What is even more puzzling about the Court's treatment of precedent
on this point is its use ofNollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); and Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981) to support
the proposition that when all economically beneficial or productive use of land has been
denied, the landowner is treated categorically as having suffered a taking, since none of
these cases involves total economic or productive loss of property. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2893-94.
38. "Merely a right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard." This concept was used to sustain zoning regulations in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
39. In Lucas, the Supreme Court found the failure by the lower court to conduct a
more searching review and its tautological reliance on the nuisance principle to be
reversible error. The Lucas majority rejects "noxious use logic" as a "touchstone to
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The third, and by far the most controversial, of the three
cornerstone cases of the modem takings doctrine was Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon. 40 In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court for
the first time struck down a regulation as an uncompensated taking
on the sole ground that state law41 had gone "too far" in diminishing the economic value of the landowner's property.
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are
gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is
the extent of the dimunition. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. 42

The decision contributed a third takings test for courts to apply:
the extent to which the government's action diminished the economic value of the landowner's property. 43
Generally referred to as the touchstone of the regulatory takings doctrine, 44 Pennsylvania Coal is perhaps best known for its
opacity on the precise contours of that doctrine. Holmes' failure to
define how far was "too far" 45 in his economic diminution test
distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation:• Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
40. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a spirited critique of Justice Holmes' decision, see J.
Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments For the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22
EcoLOGY L.Q. _ _ (1994) (at 12-22 in unpublished draft manuscript on file with the
Harvard EIWironmental Law Review). For additional critical commentary, see Rubenfeld,
Usings, supra note 4, at 1086-87.
41. The state statute, the Kohler Act, prohibited the mining of coal beneath the
property of another in such a way as to cause subsidence damage. See Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 412-13. These rights are called support rights, which grant neighboring owners
reciprocal easements of support.
42. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (finding that
New York City's historical preservation ordinance, which prevented landowner from
constructing skyscraper on property, does not effect taking because landowner could
transfer rights to adjacent properties) offered a variation on the diminution test by looking
not at the extent of loss suffered by the landowner, but at the value of the remaining use
of the land.
44. One scholar has referred to Pennsylvania Coal as the "Everest" of takings law.
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 156 (1977), quoted in
Rubenfeld,. Usings, supra note 4, at 1086.
45. One of the issues in Pennsylvania Coal that remains unresolved today is the
so-called denominator question: what part of the landowner's property should be used as
the denominator in the takings equation? The Kohler Act left the mining companies with
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initiated years of judicial struggling46 to produce a workable formula to answer that question.
Pennsylvania Coal also left unreconciled the conflict between
the nuisance principle and the new economic diminution or residuum test. For instance, Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal
raised Mugler and its progeny in defense of the state law,47 but
Holmes did not even mention Mugler in the majority opinion.
Fifty-five years later, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,48 the Court sustained another Pennsylvania statute
aimed at preventing surface subsidence from coal mining, because
"Pennsylvania acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant
threat to the common welfare."49 The Keystone Court, however,
neither affirmed the Mugler line of cases nor specifically overruled
Pennsylvania Coal, continuing the confusion begun by Justice Holmes in the latter case. 50 The stage was set for David Lucas to try
no economic value in the below-ground estate. Justice Brandeis, in dissent, argued that
the whole estate, not just the below-ground estate, should be examined to determine the
extent of the economic loss suffered by the landowner. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S.
at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The debate over the denominator in the takings equation
continues in the Lucas decision, which concedes that "the rhetorical force of [the Court's]
'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be
measured." 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. Footnote 7 to Lucas describes Penn Central as an
"extreme" and "unsupportable view of the relevant calculus," and indicates a willingness
to revisit the question, casting a cloud over that precedent. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
The majority hints that the resolution of the denominator question may also lie in a state's
common law of property and to what degree the state's common law has recognized and
protected the particular legal interest which the taking claimant alleges has decreased in
value.
See also Thll v. Virginia, 61 U.S.L.W. 3215, 3226 (U.S. October 6, 1992) (describing
the unpublished Nov. 4, 1991 ruling of the Accomack County Circuit Court as folows:
"Denial of permit to fill approximately two acres of wetlands that are part of 43-acre site
that was to be subdivided for use as mobile home sites did not deprive owners of all
economically viable use of their property, and thus there has been no taking of property
by inverse condemnation."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992). See also Sugameli, Sound
and Fury, supra note 7, at 462-84 (discussing post-Lucas cases on this and other points
of interest). Resolution of the denominator question is of great importance in wetlands
permit denial cases, since these cases frequently involve only a fraction of the landowner's
total property ownership.
46. It has been suggested that this struggle might be "inevitable," given the
difficulty of "defining the line between valid majoritarian regulatory demands and invalid
confiscation of individual property rights." ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 457 (1992).
47. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
48. 480 u.s. 470 (1987).
49. Id. at 485; see also Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 4, at 1090 n.91 (noting that
Justice Stevens labelled bulk of Holmes' decision in Pennsylvania Coal "advisory," in
order to distinguish that case from Keystone with respect to Mugler nuisance principle).
50. The Supreme Court in Keystone acknowledged that state law had not caused a
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to bring these two takings tests together in a way that favored his
interests.
B. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci151
In 1986, David Lucas, a real estate developer, bought two
undeveloped lots on Isle de Palm, South Carolina. 52 He intended to
build a home for his family on one lot and to use the second for
construction of another single-family residence for resale. 53 Mr.
Lucas' plans were interrupted in 1988 by the South Carolina legislature's passage of the Beachfront Management Act. 54 This Act
effectively stopped Lucas from proceeding with his plans by prohibiting development seaward of a setback line. 55
Lucas elected not to contest the setback line,56 but immediately
challenged the Beachfront Management Act in state court. 57 He
total loss of economic viability, since the owner retained significant economic value in the
non-support parts of the estate unaffected by the law, and so relied on Mug/er to sustain
the law. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1987).
While doing so, however, the Supreme Court left standing the conflict between two
different views of the takings doctrine (economic viability and harm-preventing).
51. The background facts are drawn from the majority's opinion in Lucas, from
Justice Blackmon's dissent, and from the amicus curiae Brief in Support of Respondent,
filed by Nueces County, Texas et al., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992) (No. 91-453) (copy on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
The author participated in the drafting of that brief. See generally Lazarus, Spin, supra
note 13.
52. Isle de Palm, which has been under development since the late 1970s, is a
barrier island situated eastward of Charleston, South Carolina. During Hurricane Hugo,
which hit South Carolina particularly hard in 1989, the entire Isle de Palm was flooded.
Generally, everything on the island within 500 feet of the water, including Lucas' property,
was either severely damaged or completely destroyed. Herbert S. Saffir, Hurricane Hugo
and the Implications for Design Professionals and Code-Writing Authorities, 8 J. CoASTAL
REs. 25, 27 (Special Issue, 1991).
53. Lucas had been involved in the development of Isle de Palm since the late
1970s. He paid $975,000 for the two lots. A house had been constructed on the lot between
his two lots, and there were several houses on other nearby beachfront lots. Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. at 2887, 2889.
54. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 48-39-290 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
55. Prior to passage of the 1988 Beachfront Management Act, Lucas' property had
been zoned for single-family residential construction. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
56. Under the Act, the South Carolina Coastal Council was directed to establish a
baseline connecting the landward-most points of erosion on the Isle de Palm during the
last forty years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290 (Law. Co-op. 1993). The baseline the
Council drew for Lucas effectively blocked him from developing his land other than to
construct nonhabitable improvements like "wooden walkways" and "small wooden docks."
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90 n.2.
57. In 1990, the State amended the law to authorize the Coastal Council to issue
special permits for construction of habitable dwellings seaward of the baseline. S.C. CoDE
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alleged the Act destroyed all economically viable use of his property, and thus worked a compensable taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.58 Lucas' position that he was entitled to
compensation regardless of the Act's alleged "police power" purpose directly challenged the nuisance exception to the Just Compensation Clause. 59
The state trial court agreed with Lucas and awarded him over
$1.2 million. 60 The State Supreme Court reversed, 61 finding that the
nuisance principle applied to the Beachfront Management Act.62
The State court relied on Mugler v. Kansas 63 and its progeny for
support. 64 The State court did not examine the legislative findings
in the Beachfront Management Act, because Lucas conceded their
validity. 65
ANN. § 48-39-290(0)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1993). Lucas elected not to apply for a special
permit, but to continue to prosecute his court action. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). The South Carolina Supreme Court declined to dismiss the appeal as
unripe, because Lucas had not had an opportunity to apply for such a permit, nor had the
Coastal Council an opportunity to respond to that application. South Carolina Coastal
Council v. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d 895, 902 n.8 (S.C. 1991); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
58. Lucas 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90.
59. Jd.
60. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
61. Two dissenting State Supreme Court Justices agreed that Mugler precluded the
finding of a compensable taking if the state law is necessary to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare, but believed the 1988 Act did not have as its primary purpose the
prevention of a nuisance or comparable harms. Instead, the dissenters postulated that the
Act conferred a benefit on the state by creating wildlife habitat and places of natural beauty
as well as promoting tourism. South Carolina Coastal Council v. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d 895,
906 (S.C. 1991). The dissenters would have found a taking based on the trial court's
finding that the lots lacked fair market value and economically viable use, and then would
have remanded the matter back to the Coastal Council to allow Lucas to apply for special
permits under the 1990 Amendments. Only if the Council then denied those permits would
the dissenters have awarded Lucas compensation. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d at 907-08.
62. In a companion case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed
with the South Carolina Supreme Court that the Beachfront Management Act's prohibition
against the rebuilding of structures between the setback line and the baseline neither
effected a taking nor worked a due process violation. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 939 F.2d 165, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992)
(finding that substantial reduction of property's attractiveness to potential purchasers does
not establish right to compensation) (citing Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S.
1, 15 (1984)). See also Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 403 S.E.2d 620 (S.C.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 185 (1991) (holding denial of permit to build bulkhead not
taking).
63. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that prohibiting the sale and manufacture of
intoxicating liquors did not constitu.te a taking).
64. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). See, e.g.,
supra notes 36-37.
65. Lucas did not contest the findings of the State law that construction in the coastal
zone threatened an important public resource and created a public nuisance. I d. at 898.
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 66 The case generated intense interest67 because it offered the first opportunity since
the Court's rulings in 198768 for a new pronouncement on takings law.69
A majority of the Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina
Supreme Court decision sustaining application of the Beachfront
Management Act7° to Lucas' property.71 Relying heavily on dicta
from Agins v. Tiburon, 72 the Supreme Court held in Lucas that
66. 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
67. 1\venty-seven amicus curiae briefs were filed: 16 supporting the petitioner and
11 supporting the respondent. For a list of those interests that filed amicus briefs, see
Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 453. There was considerable dissension within
the federal government over whether the United States should support the Coastal
Council's regulation, which implemented the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1451-1464 (1972). Although the Solicitor General ultimately filed a brief supporting
reversal, he rejected a strong pro-takings brief drafted by the Acting Assistant Attorney
General in response to objections to that draft raised by National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration ("NOAA"), Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA"), and Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). See responses to Peter
R. Steenland, Jr., Chief of the Appellate Section of the Environment and Natural Resources
Division, Department of Justice, from Thomas A. Campbell, General Counsel, NOAA
(Dec. 5, 1991), William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of the Army (Dec. 20,
1991), Patricia M. Gramley, General Counsel, FEMA (Dec. 20, 1991); and an internal
memorandum from Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, Acting General Counsel, EPA, to the EPA
Administrator (Dec. 20, 1991) (referenced documents on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
68. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that
approval of building permit need not depend on owner granting public access); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(holding temporary deprivations of use to be col!lpensable under Takings Clause); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (sustaining state law
prohibiting mining that caused subsidence).
69. For a list of other takings cases handled by the Court in its 1991-92 Term, see
supra note 5.
70. Conservationists have taken some comfort from the fact that the Lucas decision
did not declare the Beachfront Management Act unconstitutional; the Court merely held
invalid its application to Lucas' property.
71. Until Lucas, courts had generally sustained beach setback laws. See, e.g., Gorieb
v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (holding that ordinance requiring new houses to be set back
reasonable distance from streets does not violate due process); Esposito v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992)
(sustaining Beachfront Management Act's prohibition against rebuilding previously destroyed dwellings between setback and base lines); McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727
F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (sustaining oceanfront setback ordinance); Hall v. Board
of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987) (sustaining law prohibiting development in
certain sensitive shoreline areas). For a thorough analysis of these and other state setback
laws as well as the fate of beach access laws when faced with takings challenges, see
Amelia T.R. Starr, 'Ruin Hath Taught Me Thus to Ruminate': Rejecting the Regulatory/Eminent Domain Dichotomy for Coastal Land, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117,
138-47 [hereinafter Starr, Coastal Land].
72. The principle that land-use regulation that fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land effects a taking
was introduced as dicta in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); the Lucas
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persons suffering total economic deprivationn as a result of government regulation are categorically74 entitled to compensation unless background common law principles of nuisance or property
justify the restriction. 75 The Court remanded the case for a finding
majority's elevation of this to the level of a categorical rule immediately generated
controversy. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992).
"The Court's suggestion that Agins ... created a new per se rule ... is unpersuasive."
Id. at 2911 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[O]ur rulings have rejected such an absolute
position." Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Agins is generally considered to stand for
the obverse principle, that the ultimate conclusion in a takings case "necessarily requires
a weighing of private and public interests." 447 U.S. at 261.
73. In reaching its decision, the Lucas majority deferred to the trial court's finding
that' the Act deprived Lucas of all economically viable use of his land. Professor Lazarus
cites this omission as one of several obstacles (the others being ripeness and standing) the
majority leapt over in its eagerness to confer a win on Lucas. See Lazarus, Spin, supra
note 13, at 1418-21. This assumption of total economic ruin generated acerbic comment
from several of the other Justices, and formed the basis of Justice Souter's statement, in
which he voted to dismiss the writ for being improvidently granted. See 112 S. Ct. at 2925
(Souter, J., separate statement); see also id. at 2896 n.9 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. By treating total economic diminution cases categorically, the majority apparently rejected the case-by-case approach which had dominated previous takings jurisprudence cases. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If one fact about
the Court's taking jurisprudence can be stated without contradiction, it is that 'the
particular circumstances of each case' determines [sic] whether a specific restriction will
be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay compensation.") (citations omitted).
See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("[T]his
court ... has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government."); United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952) (taking into account the
context of the government's action when deciding takings case); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("[T]his is a question of degree-and therefore cannot
be disposed of by general propositions."); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405
(1915) (looking at the circumstances of the individual case in evaluating effect of city
ordinance); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 ("[N]o precise rule determines when property has
been taken . . . . [T]he question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public
interests."); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887) (holding that state statute which
retroactively closed down brewery, thereby depriving owner of use of his property, was
not unconstitutional).
On its face, the application of a categorical rule to a takings claim eliminates any
consideration of the validity of the purpose of the government's restrictive activities. Cf
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (holding that takings case
"entails inquiry into ... the character of the governmental action, its economic impact,
and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations"). This use of a per
se rule to dispose summarily of a second category of takings claims parallels the Court's
tendencies in other areas of constitutional law, such as the two-tiered strict scrutiny or
rational basis standard of review it has used in First Amendment, Commerce Clause, Due
Process, and Equal Protection cases. Under that approach, laws subject to strict scrutiny
rarely survive the review, while those subject to the (less searching) rational basis test are
sustained. Perversely, because the circumstances requiring strict scrutiny do not occur
frequently, just as total takings are rare, the approach results in a reverse presumption,
with most laws being sustained. This same phenomenon may occur after Lucas as
well. See Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1427-28, for further exposition of this thought.
75. The U.S. Supreme Court briefly discussed the issue of whether Lucas' claim
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on whether South Carolina's common law of nuisance or property
would bar construction of Lucas' dwellings. 76
The Supreme Court was divided over the use of nuisance as
the touchstone for determination of a taking. Justice Scalia wrote
for the majority, which included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
dissented, and while Justice Kennedy concurred, all three Justices
found the majority's use of the common law of nuisance "too
narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society."77 Furthermore, Justices Blackmun78 and
Stevens79 considered the case unripe for the Court to decide. Justice
Souter, filing a se:parate statement, was disturbed that the district
was unripe because of the 1990 Amendment to the Beachfront Management Act allowing
him to apply for a special permit, which he had not done. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2890-91. The Court noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision, by reaching
the merits and not resting its judgment on ripeness grounds, precluded both "practically
and legally" any temporary takings claim by Lucas for the economic losses he suffered
prior to the statutory amendment. ld. at 2888. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme
Court identified as a separate issue the question of whether the remand created a cause of
action for Lucas for the temporary taking of his property. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992).
76. The majority noted that "[i]t seems unlikely that common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's
land [because they] rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land." Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2901 (citations omitted). But see Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1424
(misconception of essential uses).
77. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that the common law of nuisance may accord with most expectations of
property owners who face regulation, he felt that coastal property may present "such
unique concerns for a fragile land system" that the state could exceed the bounds of the
common law of nuisance. !d.
78. Justice Blackmun argued that: (1) the 1990 Amendment to the Beachfront
Management Act authorizing special permits meant Lucas had not suffered a taking;
(2) any temporary taking claim Lucas might have had was barred by his failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies; and (3) there was no evidence in the record to support the
trial court's finding that Lucas' property had lost all value. !d. at 2907-08 (B1ackmun, J.,
dissenting). Blackmun also objected to the breadth of the Court's decision in a very narrow
case. !d. at 2904. He criticized the majority opinion for altering "long-settled rules of
review" by not deferring to the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision to accept the
unchallenged judgment of its state legislature. !d. at 2909. Blackmun also opposed the
majority's decision to place on states the burden of convincing courts that legislative
judgments are correct. !d. at 2909.
79. Justice Stevens commented on the absence in the record of any evidence of
injury-in-fact, which would entitle Lucas to even a temporary takings claim. In particular,
Stevens noted that Lucas had acquired his property eighteen months before the state Beach
Management Act was passed, and there was no evidence he had ever applied for a permit.
!d. at 2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens bemoaned the majority's failure
to avoid the "premature adjudication" of an important constitutional question. !d. at 2917.
He objected to the "illogical" expansion of the concept of regulatory takings. !d. He also
argued, as did Justice Blackmun, that takings jurisprudence does not support the majority's
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court's finding that Lucas had been deprived of all economic interest in his land had not been reviewed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, and was possibly in error. 80 None of the four Justices
addressed the appropriateness of the majority's reference to "background principles of the State's law of property." 81
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the State Supreme
Court for a ruling on whether, as a matter of state law, common
law principles of nuisance or property would have prevented the
construction of David Lucas' houses. 82 The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that such principles would not bar the construction, 83 found that the Beachfront Management Act resulted in a
temporary taking of Lucas' property, and further remanded the case
for a trial on the issue of the "actual damages" suffered by Lucas
for the "temporary nonacquisitory taking [of his property]." 84 The
issue of damages never reached a jury trial, as the State settled
with Lucas for $1.5 million. 85
The next part of this Article addresses those common law
principles that the South Carolina State Supreme Court considered
in concluding that Lucas was entitled to compensation.

new categorical rule, and dismissed Agins as dicta which had not been followed in the
Court's rulings before Lucas. Id. at 2917-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2911
n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., statement).
81. Id. at 2900.
82. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
83. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
According to one of the Coastal Council lawyers, there was never an opportunity for a
full briefing either on the applicability of the nuisance exception to Lucas' situation, or
on the validity of the trial court's factual finqing of complete loss of economic value,
because of the accelerated pace at which the State court conducted the remand. See
Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1413 n.14.
84. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). The
South Carolina State Supreme Court held that Lucas had suffered a temporary taking
commencing with the enactment of the 1988 Act through November 20, 1992, the date of
the court order. The South Carolina court also noted that Lucas could apply for a special
permit, equivalent to a variance or exemption from the statutory probition, which could,
if denied by the Coastal Council, trigger a second takings challenge by Lucas. ld.
85. In a bizarre twist to the story, after the settlement in which South Carolina
compensated Lucas for the land, the Coastal Council announced its intent to sell the lots
for development, saying "with a house to either side and in between the lots, it is
reasonable and prudent to allow houses to be built." See H. Jane Lehman, Accord Ends
Fight Over Use of Land, WASH. PosT, July 17, 1993, at El.
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BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW OF
NUISANCE AND PROPERTY

The background principles of the common law of nuisance and
property have always been part of takings jurisprudence. 86 Yet their
newfound prominence in regulatory takings jurisprudence, as a
result of Lucas, has left scholars,87 jurists,88 and state officials 89
concerned about their effect on the ability of state regulators to
protect the public interest. 90 The Luca~ Court's reliance upon common law doctrines to provide an "exogenous anchor for takings
law" 91 need not be a cause for concern-at least with respect to
protection of wetlands and barrier beaches. 92
86. As Professor Humbach points out in an article highly critical of Lucas, the common
law of nuisance has "long been relevant" to takings analysis because "background principles
of the state's law of ... nuisance shape the contours of constitutional 'title'." Humbach,
Nuisance, supra note 9, at 7. The same can be said of the common law of property. See
generally Joseph L. Sax, Rights That "Inhere in the Title Itself": The Impact of the Lucas
Case on Western Water Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 943 (1993) (advocating that government's
right to constrain use of property is limited by what it withheld from owners at outset,
which requires review of historical definition of property) [hereinafter Sax, Western Water].
87. See, e.g., Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9.
88. Justice Stevens complains that the majority's use of common law doctrines
represents a return to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and will "freeze" state
common law by depriving state legislatures of their traditional power to revise that law as
it affects private property rights. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy finds the common law of nuisance "too narrow a confine for the exercise of
regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society." Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Blackmun "searches in vain ... for anything resembling a principle
in the common law of nuisance." /d. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. 1\venty-six states, the Territory of Guam, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the South Carolina Coastal Council. California
also filed a separate brief in support of the Coastal Council specifically addressing its
concern that it would not be able to protect the public interest if the Supreme Court found
a taking in Lucas. Brief of Amicus Curiae State of California in Support of Respondent,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453).
90. The majority does not explain how its new rule will be applied to a federal
statute. Given that the U.S. Supreme Court generally has construed federal statutes to oust
federal common law, Lucas creates the interesting question of whether federal courts will
be expected to apply state common law principles to federal statutes. See, e.g., Middlesex
County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that
complex and comprehensive nature of Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act precludes tenable inference that Congress intended additional extrastatutory remedies); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981)
(holding that 1972 Clean Water Act ousted federal common law). Professor Lazarus
sidesteps this question by assuming the Supreme Court's ripeness rules will require "as
applied" challenges to be initiated at the state level, or that the federal courts may abstain
in order to provide state courts with the first opportunity to resolve these issues of state
law. See Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1430.
91. Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 10.
92. There may be other causes for. concern. For example, the Court failed to define

1995]

Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches

19

This part of the Article examines the Lucas Court's use of the
nuisance doctrine in its takings analysis, and shows how the astonishing
modernity of the doctrine93 expands the circumstances in which
courts may sustain state regulations. 94 The Article then examines
how various property law principles have historically proscribed·
certain uses of property, thus preventing such uses from being "part
of [the] title to begin with." 95

A. The Common Law of Nuisance
The common law of nuisance provides "[the] frameworks for
varying the outer contours" of ·an individual's right to use her
property in certain ways. 96 Judges have historically used this ~rame
work to help them determine whether a particular use is intolerably
harmful.97 Unfortunately, there may be no more "impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance."'98 Consequently, the doctrine is extremely malleable, especially at the state court level. 'The Lucas Court's infusion of this
extremely subjective, fluid doctrine into the law on takings is almost counterintuitive, given the Court's apparent desire to make
takings law more determinate and to limit exceptions to the Just
Compensation Clause.99
what constitutes a "reasonable remaining use" of a landowner's property, Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. at 2894 n.7, which may affect the landowner's ability to show total loss of the
beneficial use of her property. As a result, the problem of choosing an economic yardstick
by which to measure the remaining use leaves the lower courts in the same analytic
quagmire in which they were caught before Lucas. Similarly, the Court's reliance on
common law principles to create a narrow band of exceptions to its bright line categorical
rule (that total economic loss effects a taking) may plunge the lower courts into an ad hoc
search for the contours of that common law doctrine. See Sax, Western Water, supra note
86.
93. The majority in Lucas illustrates the modem application of the nuisance doctrine
by discussing a nuclear power plant sited on an earthquake fault. This example defines the
reference to prohibitions that "inhere in the title itself." 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
94. For a contrary view of the nuisance doctrine and its application by the Court in
Lucas, see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9.
95. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
96. Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 11.
97. See id.
98. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 616
(5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 n.19 (Blackmun,
J ., dissenting).
99. The Court tried to control the leeway it feared it had given lower courts in
interpreting state common law principles by warning in a clarifying footnote, "[A]n
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According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a landowner
commits a nuisance when the use of her property interferes
substantially with the reasonable use, enjoyment, or value of
another landowner's property. 100 Whether a particular activity creates a nuisance depends upon the seriousness of the harm it could
cause to adjacent property or to the public at large, 101 the social
value 102 of the landowner's activities, 103 the location and surroundings of the activity (i.e., the context within which the activity
occurred), 104 and the relative ease with which the harm can be
avoided through measures taken by the landowner, the government,
or the adjacent property owner. 105 Nuisance doctrine draws upon
the maxim "sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas"-"one should
use her own property in such a manner as not to injure the interests of others."
The nuisance doctrine's malleability results from the multifactored balancing process 106 judges employ to determine which
harms to prohibit and which to permit. The balance of utilities
shifts over time to reflect changing mores and expectations about
affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be defended only if
an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial
uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902
n.18 (emphasis in original). But see Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1430 (stating that it
is unlikely either that state courts will find their own application of precedents unreasonable or that federal courts will second-guess state judicial counterparts).
100. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 821F, 822A, 826 (1977). The
harms inflicted on that second landowner must be "significant" and "unreasonable" to
constitute nuisance. !d.
101. Id. at §§ 826, 827.
102. The majority's failure to consider Lucas' construction of a house, in most
circumstances a benign activity, to be a nuisance in its proposed location may be another
indication of the Court's belief in the social value of development of real property, and
its eagerness to give it heightened constitutional protection. See Lazarus, Spin, supra note
13, at 1421-25.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1977).
104. "[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building
of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether a particular thing is
a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the
thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the
locality." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). See also Thomas Cusak
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1916) (upholding municipal ordinance regulating
erection and maintenance of billboards in residential districts); Reinman v. City of Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (sustaining reversal of Chancery Court decree enjoining
enforcement of municipal ordinance forbidding livery stable within designated area);
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (sustaining building commissioner's denial of permit
where proposed building's height exceeded that allowed under local ordinance).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827E, 828C, 830 (1977).
106. See Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 10.
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personal conduct, 107 thereby forcing the doctrine to change and
evolve. 108 Nuisance, therefore, is anything but a certain, objective,
static doctrine, 109 since it depends upon a judge's determination at
a given point in time of the acceptability of consequences arising
out of otherwise nonprohibited conduct. no
Although nuisance is a common law concept, it is affected by
the legislature through its role in defining public welfare. In Legislators, especially in the environmental arena, are responsible for
107. See id. at 11 ("common law of private nuisance is not a defined catalogue of
noxious, reprehensible or even merely forbidden behavior, but is instead an essentially
relativistic concept.").
108. Even the majority recognized that the nuisance doctrine is in essence evolutionary. "The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated
owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition (although changed
circumstances, or new knowledge may make what was previously pennissible no longer
so)." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 827 cmt. g
(1977)) (emphasis added).
109. One of the ambiguities of the Lucas opinion, as Professor Sax points out, is
the time at which the restriction on use "inheres in the title." Sax, Western Water, supra
note 86, at 944 n.8. Given the two very modern examples used by the Court (placing fill
in a lake that causes flooding of others' land and siting a nuclear power plant over an
earthquake fault) to illustrate when a landowner might not be entitled to compensation in
the face of a prescriptive regulatory action (Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01) and its reliance
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901), the Court appears
to employ a functional or expectational rather than a historical definition of nuisance. If
that supposition is correct, then a court, consistent with Lucas, could judge a landowner's
conduct according to the nuisance doctrine in effect at the time the state sought to regulate
that conduct. Compare this result with Professor Sax's view that the tone and rhetoric of
the Lucas opinion, at least with respect to the Court's use of background principles of
property, "seems deliberately calculated to cut off arguments that changing times create
changing needs and with them the changing (diminished) expectations that property
owners must internalize." Sax, Western Water, supra note 86, at 945. But see Richard C.
Ausness, Wild Dunes and Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the Lucas Decision on Shoreline
Protection Programs, 10 DENY. U. L. REv. 437, 466 (1993) (Courts have institutional
advantage over legislatures in determining existing nuisance and property law. Legislatures
represent narrow special interests, while courts are experienced in dealing with legal
concepts and more likely to be neutral decision-makers. Hence, background principles of
nuisance and property law are free to change over time as they have always done in the
past.). [hereinafter Ausness, Wild Dunes].
110. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard.").
111. See Berlin, Just Compensation, supra note 13 (arguing that Lucas denigrates
role of legislators in making findings about public welfare). But see Lazarus, Spin, supra
note 13, at 1426-27 (arguing that majority's intimations that background principles must
be supplied by judge-made common law and not by legislative or regulatory initiatives
will not survive review in future because of Court's changing composition). See also
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 139, 150 (1988) (arguing that the only way to bring about more than
peripheral change in the status of property rights is for Court to order legislatures to get
out of the business of legislating) [hereinafter Sax, Property Rights].
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filling numerous gaps in the common law. 112 Indeed, both the legislatures and the courts have played major roles in expanding the
reach of common law nuisance, particularly with respect to protection of the environment and natural resources. 113 Moreover, on the
policy-making side, the courts have frequently led the way for
legislatures, particularly in environmental decisions. 114
State courts have historically expanded the class of activities
covered by nuisance law in response to changing values and priorities.115 The passage of environmental statutes and regulations has
112. Legislation has filled the gaps in common law in order to protect endangered
species, Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988), wetlands, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (1988), and fragile coastal areas, Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451
(1988).
113. While Lucas has clearly enhanced the role of the courts and judge-made
common law in the takings equation, it has not ousted legislators from the process. The
very nature of nuisance law and its development shows an interplay between the legislature
and the courts. One commentator has described this interplay as a "functional dialogue."
Memorandum from Professor Zygmunt Plater, Boston College Law School, to Cotton
Harness, General Counsel, South Carolina Coastal Council4 (Nov. 14, 1992) (on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Given the importance of this dialogue, and the
way in which Lucas has focused on its results in takings jurisprudence, one would expect
both the dialogue and the role of legislatures in defining nuisance law to continue.
114. Courts occasionally display greater sympathy to the inchoate values of natural
resources and are willing to accord deference to the expert agencies charged with
protecting them. Compare Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (holding
that a landowner has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential character of
her land by using it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state) and Marks
v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (en bane) (recognizing public trust easement for
purpose of preserving land in natural state) with S. 177, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bill
to codify Executive Order 12,630 requiring federal agencies to perform takings analysis
of all regulatory initiatives) and H.R. 1330, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bill providing,
among other things, for automatic compensation of any owner of wetlands that have been
classified as bearing critical significance to long-term conservation of the surrounding
ecosystem). See also Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 448 n.42 (state takings
legislation). Courts also are not held hostage by special interests like legislatures are. See
Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins, supra note 7, at 958-59 (arguing that requiring legislation to
pass two hurdles is a welcome institutional barrier to special interest legislation, and that
the imperfection of politics provides strong reason to put aside deference to legislators).
For general polemics against the democratic branch of government, see Ausness, Wild
Dunes, supra note 109, at 466 (arguing that courts have institutional advantage over
legislatures in determining existing nuisance and property law: legislatures represent
narrow special interests while courts are experienced in dealing with legal concepts and
more likely to be neutral decision-makers). For a more neutral view, see Daniel A. Farber
& Paul P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the
New Public Law, 89 MicH. L. REv. 875, 905-06 (1991) (explaining that legislatures may
be more legitimate in theory and capable in practice of defining public values than judges,
but institutional insulation of judges and deliberative qualities stressed by republicanism
empower common law judges to promote legal change in pursuit of public values).
115. See Richard Lazarns, Changing Concepts of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 660-61
(1986) (arguing that substantive scope of both public and private nuisance law has
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not diminished the relevancy of the doctrine. For example, courts
have on various occasions required defendants to pay damages for
air pollution, 116 abate water pollution, 117 stop discharging raw sewage into a body of water, 118 pay the cleanup costs of a permitted
hazardous waste dump site, 119 abate exposure to toxic chemicals, 120
force the relocation of a feedlot, 121 provide for the private maintenance of a public road to control dust from coal haul trucks, 122 pay
damages for contamination of well water, 123 and pay punitive damages for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos more than forty
years earlier. 124 Courts have also used nuisance law to hold defendants liable for causing aesthetic harm by requiring the removal of
an "unsightly eyesore" from a wooded mountain area. 125 One court
has even held the United States government liable for failing to
protect residents from the adverse effects of exposure to radioactive fallout from bomb tests. 126
In short, nuisance is a vibrant common law doctrine which has
been and continues to be used to protect land from harmful development.
There is simply no common law doctrine that approaches
nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land
willingly embraced environmental and natural resource concerns) [hereinafter Lazarus,
Changing Concepts].
116. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
117. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
118. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 816 (Wash. 1984).
119. New York v. Schenectady Chern. Co., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1983).
120. Wood v. Picallo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982).
121. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (holding
that maintenance of animal feedlot creates public nuisance entitling plaintiff to injunctive
relief).
122. West v. National Mines, 285 S.E.2d 670 (W.Va. 1981), discussed in Gene W.
Bailey II, Case Comment, West v. National Mines: Creation of Private Nuisance By Use
of Public Property, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 263 (1983).
123. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) (awarding
damages for contamination of culinary water wells by defendant's percolating oil well
formation water); see also Langan v. Valicopters, 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (awarding
damages to organic farmer for loss of certification due to drifting of aerial pesticide spray).
124. Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986).
125. Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
obnoxious debris, including stockpiled old cars, scrap metal, oil drums, and general litter,
is actionable under nuisance theory). For an interesting discussion of traditional common
law nuisance and its applicability to aesthetic harm, see Stephen Woodbury, Aesthetic
Nuisance: The Time Has Come to Recognize It, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 877, 878 (1987)
[hereinafter Woodbury, Aesthetic Nuisance].
126. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984).
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use and of technological abuse. Nuisance actions have involved
pollution of all physical media-air, water, land-by a wide
variety of means .... Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every major industrial and municipal activity which is
today the subject of comprehensive environmental regulationthe operation of land fills, incinerators, sewage treatment facilities, activities at chemical plants, aluminum, lead and copper
smelters, oil refineries, pulp mills, rendering plants, quarries
and mines, textile mills and a host of other manufacturing
activities .... Nuisance theory and case law is [sic] the common law backbone of modern environmental and energy law. 127

Development is particularly harmful to barrier beaches and
wetlands because, from an ecological perspective, both types of
resources have their greatest value when left in their natural state.
They are also among this country's most economically important128
and fragile natural systems. 129 Their protection benefits society as
a whole 130 both in terms of revenues realized and costs averted. 131
Allowing their destruction leads to public injury, usually in the
127. WILLIAM RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 100
(1977), quoted in Woodbury, Aesthetic Nuisance, supra note 125, at 877 n.2.
128. The importance of coastal beach dune systems was recognized by the South
Carolina legislature in the Beachfront Management Act. The "beach/dune system along
the coast of South Carolina is extremely important to the people of the state." Beachfront
Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). In support of
this conclusion, the state statute lists the functions that these systems provide for the state,
such as protecting life and property by functioning as a storm barrier to dissipate wave
energy, contributing revenue to the state's tourism industry, and providing habitat for
numerous species of plants and animals and a healthful environment for the state's citizens.
!d.
129. Beaches are particularly fragile ecosystems subject to the erosive force of
ocean tides and waves and energy storms. See generally amicus curiae Brief in Support
of Respondent, filed by Nueces County, Texas et al. at 4-11, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453), and sources cited therein (copy on
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Coastal erosion and migration has
become even more pronounced and volatile as a result of sea level rise. See OFFICE OF
WETLAND PROTECTION, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No.
EPA-230-05-86-013, GREENHOUSE EFFECT, SEA LEVEL RISE, AND COASTAL WETLANDS
(James G. Titus ed., 1988); JOHN R. CLARK, THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, COASTAL
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: A ThCHNICAL MANUAL FOR THE CONSERVATION OF COASTAL
ZONE RESOURCES (1977); see also GEOPHYSICS STUDY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL RESEARCH
CouNCIL, SEA LEVEL CHANGE 4 (1990) (predicting that "[o]ne hundred years from now
it is likely that sea level will be [1.6 to 3.3 feet] higher than it is at present.").
130. The more people who engage in a commercial activity, the greater the
opportunities for all to benefit, and the greater the scale returns. See Rose, Comedy of the
Commons, supra note 17, at 774. The greatest value of these resources, therefore, is
realized by society as a whole because of the opportunity for many individuals to benefit
from them.
131. Wetlands perform valuable socioeconomic services which are lost when they
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form of lost benefits. 132 Therefore, much of the value of coastal and
wetlands resources lies in the commercial value of the functions
they perform. 133
The essence of the evolution of the nuisance doctrine is to
respond to "changed circumstances or new knowledge [which] may
make what was previously permissible no longer so." 134 As courts
continue to apply the nuisance doctrine expansively, 135 its utility
and appeal to state regulators will increase as well. Thus, nuisance
law, far from being a limitation on state regulatory action as the
Lucas Court intended,l3 6 may instead be a source of enabling authority for state legislatures and regulatory agencies. Indeed, because
are converted to some other use. Wetlands function as the "farmlands" of the aquatic
environment and as important wintering-over habitat and feeding grounds. Hope M.
Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to its Ears in Alligators, 8 PACE ENVTL.
L. REv. 307, 309 (1991) (citing RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERiOR,
WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 13-27
(1984)). Further beneficial properties are mairttenance of water quality, erosion control,
discharge and recharge of ground water, and flood and storm surge damage control. Id.
Wetland plants form the base of the food chain, supporting higher consumers such as
commercially and recreationally important species of fish and wildlife. Id. The harvest of
indigenous products such as timber, fish, shellfish, peat, cranberries, and wild rice, as well
as recreational opportunities associated with bird watching, canoeing, hunting, and fishing,
contributed $25 billion to the economy in 1991, according to a recent report published by
the National Audubon Society. NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY, VALUING WETLANDS: THE
COST OF DESTROYING AMERiCA'S WETLANDS 29 (Deanne Kloepfer ed., 1994). When
indirect and induced economic impacts are included, that figure rises to more than
$72 billion, supporting almost 1 million jobs. Jd. The National Marine Fisheries Service
estimated in 1983 that annual fishery loss due to estuarine wetland destruction was
approximately $208 million. RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERiOR, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 36 (1984). For a
general discussion of wetland values, see id. at 13-25.
132. Conversion of wetlands or barrier beaches to private use or destruction of their
natural functions means not only the loss of these valuable public functions, but also a
reduction in returns of scale. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 768.
133. For a general discussion of coastal habitat values, see NATIONAL COALITION
FOR MARlNE CONSERVATION, STEMMING THE TIDE OF COASTAL FISH HABITAT Loss:
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM ON CONSERVATION OF COASTAL FISH HABITAT (Richard
H. Stroud ed., 1992) [hereinafter STEMMING THE TIDE]. For a discussion of wetland values,
see supra note 131. For a discussion on the difficulty of mitigating wetland losses by
restoring damaged wetlands or creating new wetlands, see Babcock, supra note 131, at
333.
134. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992).
135. Lazarus, in his comprehensive article on the public trust doctrine, discusses
gradual judicial elimination of restrictions on the use of the public nuisance doctrine: for
example, no longer limiting its use to the attorney general; no longer requiring citizens to
show special injury in order to maintain a public nuisance action; and f~eeing the doctrine
from its limiting relationship to property law concepts and terminology. He concludes that
this evolution makes the nuisance doctrine an attractive alternative to the public trust
doctrine discussed at infra part lli.B. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115,
at 661-64.
136. See Sax, Western Water, supra note 86, at 944 (arguing that use of nuisance
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the common law of nuisance is not static, 137 it provides a growing,
not shrinking, opportunity for regulatory authorities to protect the
nation's coastlines and wetland resources. 138
B. Background Principles of Property: A Look at the Common
Law Doctrines of Custom and Public Trust
The Lucas Court exempted from the new takings rule uses
proscribed by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law." 139 Most of the Lucas majority opinion focuses on the uses proscribed by state nuisance law.
Little attention has been paid to a further source of guidance: state
property law. 140 The Lucas opinion sheds no light on what background property principles the Court had in mind and whether
those principles can support preserving land in its natural state.
This Article suggests that there are useful principles, like the
maxim sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas, 141 endogenous to the
concept of property, that can be used to protect natural areas by
doctrine will lead to more compensation because relatively few things are traditionally
categorized as nuisances); cf. Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 3 ("After Lucas, ..•
remedial statutes to improve the common law will now be subject to preemption by the
common law," in an "extraordinary reversal of centuries-old roles").
137. "It is an area of the law that 'straddles the legal universe, virtually defies
synthesis, and generates case law to suit every taste."' Lucas, I 12 S. Ct. at 2914 n.19
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.4,
at 48 (1986)) (footnotes omitted).
138. Illustrating the point that the common law doctrine of nuisance is not static,
the Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. said:
Such regulations are sustaineq, under the complex conditions of our day, for
reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the
advent of automobiles and rapid transmit street railways, would have been
condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no
inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies,
the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their
operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.
272

u.s. 365, 387 (1926).

139. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
140. One exception to this is a recent article by Joseph L. Sax. Sax, Western Water,
supra note 86, at 944, 951 (arguing that definitional/historical view of property rights
which encompasses doctrines like public trust, may lead in a direction that the Court did
not intend to go, sustaining governrnent programs that diminish or abolish property rights
·
in water).
141. "One should use her own property in such a manner as not to injure the
interests of others."
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restraining the behavior of private landowners. 142 Deconstruction of
the concept of property may be a useful starting point for exploring
the restraints on landowner behavior.
Although there is debate over whether the right to acquire,
use, and transfer property is considered a natural, 143 fundamentaP 44
or civil right, 145 few would argue that the right is limitless. 146 Nuisance is one conceptual framework for defining restrictions on
property rights; the concept of property is another.
Restrictions upon use and alienation of real property flow from
a perceived need-to avoid waste. Unlike most chattels, real property
will outlast generations of owners. Professor Richard Epstein, an
advocate of otherwise unrestricted property rights, argues that property is a fundamental civil right with clear and commonly understood rules. 147 He recognizes a variety of "sensible legal adaptions"

142. For a somewhat contrary view, see Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L.
REV 1433, 1441 (1993) (explaining that background principles of nuisance and property
law do not include prescriptions requiring landowners to maintain property's natural
conditions) [hereinafter Sax, Understanding Lucas].
143. See John Clough's discussion on whether John Locke's Of Property supports
the position that the right to accumulate property is a natural right. JoHN H. CLoUGH,
PROPERTY: ILLUSIONS OF "OWNERSHIP" 17-18 (1984) (citing JOHN LOCKE, 1\vo 'TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT 327-44 (Mentor ed., 1963).
144. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*138-39 (1882), quoted in JOHN H. CLOUGH, PROPERTY: ILLUSIONS OF OWNERSHIP 29-30
n.4 (1984):
The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property:
which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions,
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land .... So
great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the
whole community.
145. See Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 188 (arguing that property rights,
regardless of their diversity, share two indicia of fundamental rights: universality and
utility).
146. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 30 ("But though property be thus protected, it
is still to be understood, that the lawgiver has a right to prescribe the mode and manner
of using it, so far as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right, to the injury or
annoyance of others, or of the public.") (quoting JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 276 (0. Halsted ed., 1889).
147. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 190-93; see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE
OF HUMAN NATURE 497 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888) ("Property must be stable, and must
be fix'd by general rules."), quoted in Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins, supra note 7, at 976
n.81. For a view of the rules of property as more malleable, see Sax, Understanding Lucas,
supra note 142, at 1446 (property definitions continuously adjust to reflect new economic

28

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 19:1

of these standard rules to avoid negative externalities and waste. 148
Each of these adaptions embodies a restraint on a landowner's
freedom to exercise her proprietary rights; 149 each also acts indirectly to protect resources from either physical destruction or overconsumption.
Epstein describes several examples of this type of adaptation-among them, laws preventing landowners from causing subsidence of neighboring property, 150 rules in communal agricultural
societies that limit both membership in the society and the practices of members in the commons, 151 and oil and gas pooling systems152 which require restrictions on private property use, such as
well-spacing regulations or unitization 153 systems. He also recognizes the wisdom of the American West's complex system of water
rights, which embodies a mix of private and collective restrictions,
entitlements, and understandings at odds with traditional rules of
private property ownership. 154
A second source of restraints on the behavior of private landowners may lie in the realm of ethics. According to Professor Carol
Rose, the concept of property includes "a normative 'deep structure"' that embraces "the qualities of restraint and responsibility." 155 Such environmental ethics can yield approaches to resource
management that supplement or replace those of private property
rights or bureaucratic authority. 156 Rose describes how legal holders
and social structures to disadvantage of existing owners). See also Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory,
15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 393 (1991) (state courts' interpretations of public trust doctrine
identify governmental duties to redefine existing private property rights where such rights
threaten ecological values of natural areas) [hereinafter Rieser, Ecological Preservation].
148. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 188.
149. See id. But Epstein has expressed contradictory views about whether property
rules should be changed to accommodate environmental concerns. Cf. Epstein, Seven
Deadly Sins, supra note 7, at 976 (arguing that permanence, stability, and certainty are all
regarded as virtues of a system of property rights, and should not be compromised on
account of environmental issues).
150. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 195.
151. Id.
152. Epstein notes that virtually all systems of private property use a rule of first
possession to assign particular things to particular individuals. See id. at 190. Pooling
systems modify this rule substantially. Id. at 195-97.
153. A system under which individual owners of oil drilling rights pool their
individual resources and agree to a system of collective management that limits the amount
of drilling any individual owner can do on her own property. I d.
154. See id. at 195-97.
155. Rose, Environmental Ethics, supra note 11, at 28.
156. Id. at 7-14.
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of property rights devise various artifices to limit individual uses
of common property, such as fishing norms or "stinting" 157 of livestock. These limits are enforced by customs and norms, and have
been adopted by common law courts. 158 In fact, entire bodies of
common-property law have come to revolve around an ethic of
"moderation, proportionality, prudence, and responsibility" toward
others who are entitled to share in common resources. 159 Individual
property rights embody these same normative characteristics. 160
A third source of restraint on landowner conduct may reside
in the communities that depend on the property. Professor Joseph
Sax argues that this dependence reflects the fact that certain types
of land fulfill important public functions. He describes several
historical examples of private property being limited by some public claim or servitude, such as the requirement that land in frontier
settlements be put to productive use within a reasonable time. 161
Such requirements advance the community's interests in that property. Professor Sax suggests a usufructuary model of property as a
means of understanding and effectuating those rights. 162
All three scholars show that the concept of property contains
generally accepted restraints on the rights of landowners to alter
their property's physical integrity. 163 To Epstein, these restraints
may originate in the rational desire of landowners to avoid waste
and negative externalities; to Rose, they are found in the normative
structure inherent in the concept of property; to Sax, they lie in
some superior claim to the land held by the public.

157. A practice, which Rose characterizes as both "widespread" and "long-lived,"
under which individuals limit their use of common property so that the collective uses do
not destroy the whole. ld. at 26-27.
158. See id.
159. ld. at 27.
160. See id. at 27-28 (theorizing that individual property-holders rely on the
recognition and acquiescence of others, and that property law assumes neighborliness and
attentiveness to needs of others in use of one's own exclusive property).
161. See Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1453.
162. See id. at 1452-54.
163. The examples used by Epstein, Rose, and Sax concern individual property
holders seeking to use a natural resource. Possession (and the concurrent right to exclude
others) is sought. Restraints must be placed on the possessory and usufructuary rights of
these individuals to avoid waste, negative externalities and antisocial behavior. This Article
examines public rights as a source of restraint on private behavior and to what extent the
public can gain access to private property. For a look at the rights and interests of the
"unorganized public," and the extent to which those rights or interests restrain the behavior
of private property holders, see Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17.
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However, none of the three addresses the question of whether
a landowner can be compelled to leave her property in its natural
state. Under their respective views of property, a landowner could
deplete significantly (perhaps completely) the resource value of her
land so long as it does not cause waste, violate normative stand~
ards, or conflict with some other community need. Sax's ecological
view of property may come the closest, by showing that land in its
unaltered state is performing important public services. 164 He sug~
gests a complete re-altering of property law in response to this
concern. 165
Perhaps a more modest proposal might involve finding whether
property law in its current form can be used to prevent a landowner
from altering her land's natural condition because of the important
public services the land may offer. To answer that question, we
turn to an examination of two specific common law property doctrines: custom and public trust.

1. The Common Law Doctrine of Customi66
A variety of common law doctrines have been employed over
time to prevent the conversion of public land to private use, or,
alternatively, to allow public access to private land. 167 Similarly,
these doctrines could be used to support government regulations
164. Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note_142, at 1442.
165. Sax favors establishing a system .of usufructuary rights that subjects private
ownership to "some public claim or servitude" in order to bring the transformative
economy into greater harmony with an ecological perspective and the economy of nature.
See id. at 1452-55.
166. For a thorough and illuminating discussion of the origins and reach of the
common law doctrine of custom, see Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at
758-61, 766-71. See also Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the Ancient Regime:
Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 19 CoRNELL L. REV.
183 (1993) [hereinafter Loux, Ancient Regime].
167. Other common law doctrines traditionally used to support public claims of
access to roads and waterways are prescription (actual, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse
use under claim of right for period of time prescribed by law), implied dedication (from
regular use of property by public in reliance on owner's acquiescence in use), adverse
possession (continuous, open, notorious, hostile, and exclusive use of property of another),
and public trust. See generally Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 723-27.
The federal navigational servitude "permits the federal government to displace or
destroy state-recognized property rights in navigable waters ... without having to pay
compensation." Joseph L. Sax & Robert H. Abrams, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 96 (1986), quoted in David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property:
A Call For Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in [Jnvironmentally Critical
Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 360 (1988) [hereinafter Hunter, Ecological
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restricting destruction of that land. The ancient doctrine of custom
has intriguing possibilities in this context. 168 Although the doctrine
of custom traditionally has been used in the United States only to
gain public access to coastal resources, such as barrier beaches, its
historic uses outside of the United States have been broader. Unfortunately, constraints inherent in the doctrine and its lack of
widespread acceptance may limit it to a "background principle" of
only narrow utility in but a few jurisdictions.
Customary claims originated in early English law, 169 which
enabled residents of specific localities 170 to claim the rights to use
a variety of land held in common as "customs of the manor." 171 To
qualify as a customary right, the custom must have existed without
dispute for a time that ran beyond memory, and had to be both
well-defined and "reasonable." 172 Uses subject to ancient customary
rights included manorial tenants' rights to graze animals, gather
wood, cut turf on the manor commons, and engage in a variety of
recreational activities. 173 Other customary rights recognized by English common law courts included market and water rights. 174
Perspective]. But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that
navigational servitude does not shield federal government from Fifth Amendment).
168. The judicial doctrine of custom is "the doctrine by which ancient customs
practiced by a definite community in a distinct geographic locale, though contrary to the
common law, are recognized by royal judges to constitute local common law for the land
and people of the region." Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 183.
169. In British jurisprudence, a general custom, the "custom of the country," is the
common law itself. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 742 (quoting 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMllfENTARIES *67 ("General customs, which are the universal
rule of the whole kingdom ... form the common law.")). For a detailed history of the
doctrine of custom in English jurisprudence, see Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166.
170. One of the more interesting aspects of the doctrine, according to Professor
Rose, is that it vests rights in the unorganized public, as opposed to individuals. She notes,
however, that although these communities were informal and indefinite, they nevertheless
were capable of self-management. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 742.
171. Custom is recognized by common law courts as lex loci or local common law.
See Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 186.
172. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 740; see also Starr, Coastal
Land, supra note 71, at 142 n.202 (proof of customary usage requires that use be
(1) ancient, (2) exercised without interruption, (3) peaceable and free from dispute, (4) reasonable, (5) certain, (6) obligatory, and (7) not repugnant to other customs or laws)
·
(paraphrasing William Blackstone).
173. Professor Rose finds it noteworthy that the surviving customary rights are those
useful for recreational purposes. See Rose,. Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at
740-41.
174. See, e.g., Race v. Ward, 4 El. & Bl. 702, 119 Eng. Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1855)
(holding no trespass action available against inhabitants for violating an enclosure decree
cutting them off from well, based on custom and fifty years of use), cited in Loux, Ancient
Regime, supra note 166, at 205. In a more recent application, custom doctrine prevented
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While early nineteenth-century American courts seemed willing, albeit reluctant, to acknowledge a limited doctrine of customary claims, 175 by the end of the century, courts appeared generally
hostile to such claims. 176 Today, only a handful of states, most
notably New Hampshire, 177 Oregon178, Texas, 179 and Hawaii, 180 recognize customary claims explicitly, 181 and then only with respect
to beach access. 182 In such jurisdictions, custom may be considered
a background principle of the law of property, because the custom
a landowner from blocking access to his land by fishermen, who had for many years dried
their nets on it. Mercer v. Denne, (1904) 2 Ch. 534 (Farwell, J.), aff'd (1905) 2 Ch. 538
(C.A.), cited in Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 186-87.
175. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 741. But see Steven
Hahn, Hunting, Fishing, and Foraging: Common Rights and Class Relations in the
Postbellum South, 26 RADICAL HisT. REV. 37 (1982) (arguing that from earliest settlement
until late in the 19th century, custom and law circumscribed and widened use rights) (copy
on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter Hahn, Hunting]. According to Hahn, the customary rights could not be abrogated by private title: "The woods
were put here by our Creator for a benefit to his people ... [endowing] custom to the
range [with] legal, moral, and bible [sanction)." !d. at 55, (citing Carroll Free Press, May
8, 1885, June 5, 1884, June 25, 1885).
176. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 741.
177. See Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524 (N.H. 1845) (recognizing customary right of
passage), cited in Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 739 n.135; see also
Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387, 409 (N.H. 1851) (upholding public right of access to collect
seaweed based on custom), cited in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 370
n.280.
178. See State .ex rei. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969) (holding
custom as basis for public access to dry sand beach); see also Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (city's denial of permit to build seawall on oceanfront
property does not effect a taking, where public use of dry sand areas is so notorious that
notice of such custom must be presumed).
179. See Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 958-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990) (holding that public easements acquired by custom do not
effect taking); Matcha v. Mattox ex rel. People, 711 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that an established easement on privately
owned beach held to be public through prescription, dedication, and custom).
180. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968) (holding that Hawaiian custom
determines location of seaward boundaries), cited in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra
note 167, at 370 n.280.
181. See United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772-73
(D. V.I. 1974), aff'd 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding public recreation area on beach
established by custom); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Idaho 1979)
(holding custom valid in Idaho although elements not met with regard to disputed parcel).
Other courts have implied limited recognition of custom, noting the Thornton decision
with favor. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d
73, 78 (Fla. 1974); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal. 1970). For these and
other citations, see Alfred T. Clayton, Jr., Casenote, Oregon's 'New' Doctrine of Custom:
McDonald v. Halvorson, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 787, 793 n.38 (1990).
182. Most states appear to have taken no position on the doctrine. Only a few
jurisdictions have rejected it. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me.
1989); Leabo v. Leninski, 438 A.2d 1153, 1156-57 (Conn. 1981); Smith v. Bruce, 244
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must be based on a use so "notorious" as to be obvious to all. 183
There are inherent limitations in the doctrine, however, which may
constrain the doctrine's versatility even in these few state jurisdictions.
First, the requirement for uninterrupted practice of a custom
may be a serious disability to the doctrine's use as an enabling
principle. Unlike the public trust doctrine, which can lie dormant
for centuries before being resurrected, 184 custom requires that the
public's use of the land be uninterrupted for as long as anyone can
remember. 185 Customary rights may lapse from disuse and can be
easily defeated by determined landowners. 186 As a result, custom
presents serious problems of proof, especially in areas undergoing
rapid development.187
Another potentially disabling factor is the restriction of the
custom doctrine in this country to beaches. Unlike the public trust
doctrine, which has grown increasingly amphibious over time, 188
custom has stayed rooted in the sand. If, however, one follows the
logic of Professor Rose's analysis of the doctrine's foundation, and
her conclusions about "inherently public property," an argument
can be made for the doctrine's potential application to a broader
array of land types. 1s9
According to Rose, if a piece of physically monopolizable
land has greatest value when held in common, the public's claim
is inherently superior to that of the private landowner. 190 As the
ancient doctrine of custom was developed to preserve the unorganized public's rights in those lands~ it follows that the doctrine can
be applied to any qualifying land. Trails across private property
S.E.2d 559, 569 (Ga. 1978); Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor and Council of
Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 1975).
183. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993).
184. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792
(Cal. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Summa Corp. v. California ex rei. State Land Comm'n, 466
U.S. 198 (1984) (public trust doctrine held not to apply). See also infra part lli.B.2.a.
185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
186. As an example, consider Yale University's practice of closing its gates once a
year to prevent the establishment of customary use.
187. For a more thorough discussion of the problems associated with the doctrine
of custom, see Jonathan M. Hoff, Comment, Public Beach Access Exactions: Extending
the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1049, 1057-60
(1981) [hereinafter Hoff, Public Beach Access].
188. See infra part lli.B.2.a. and accompanying notes.
189. For a more in-depth discussion of this concept, see infra part lli.B.2.b.
190. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 774.
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and portages around rapids on private land are but two potential
applications, both of which appear analogous to the beach access
rights that Rose discusses. 191 As discussed elsewhere in this Article,
the geographic range of custom could potentially encompass areas
where people have hiked or recreated for generations. 192 However,
given the historic resistance to custom doctrine by many states and
its limited, infrequent use, it seems unlikely that many jurisdictions
will be inclined to expand its geographic scope, no matter how
compelling the doctrinal basis.
Another limitation of custom lies in its focus; unlike the
public trust doctrine, which applies to the land itself, 193 custom
doctrine applies only to the uses to which the land has been put.
Its principles arose from habits of use and understandings about
local custom, 194 not from any particular value of the land concerned. 195 This may be a distinction without a difference, since
ruining the land would necessarily interrupt or prevent its customary use. By this means, custom can sometimes achieve the same
goal as the public trust doctrine, by preventing the land's destruction.
If a customary use can be established for a piece of land, 196
the doctrine can be applied to preserve the land for that use without
191. According to Professor Rose, beaches are the perfect fit for this paradigm,
because of the value added to the property by public recreation and the opportunity for
private holdout. See id. at 779-81. But this does not mean that other land, such as
wetlands, might not qualify. See infra part III.B.2.b.
192. See infra part III.B.2.b.
193. See infra part III.B.2.a.
194. According to one scholar, the greatest significance of custom lies in the fact
that its origins and legitimacy derive from the praxis (or use) of the community. Loux,
Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 183.
195. "It was the public's habit of use, rather than anything unique about the property
ab initio," that subjected the property to custom. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra
note ii, at 759-60, citing President of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431,
439 (1832) (holding that prolonged public usage sufficient to dedicate land to public if
interruption of use would substantially affect public accomodation).
196. In England, once a practice or use was recognized by a common law court as
the local custom of an area, it automatically became recognized by all common law courts
without proof of the custom. See Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 187. Bllt see
McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989) (modifying rule of law set down in State
ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), that custom affirmed public right to
make recreational use of Oregon's coastal beaches to apply only to beaches similarly
situated to the beach in Thornton). See also Alfred Clayton, Jr., Note, 26 WILLAMETTE L.
REv. 787, 789 (1990) (arguing that McDonald modified Thornton such that application of
doctrine of custom to Oregon coast will require tract by tract litigation).
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effecting a taking. 197 A distinct, although not undisputed, potential
advantage of custom over other common law property doctrines,
such as prescription, implied easement, or adverse possession, is
that it may be applied to a large region, rather than a single tract
of land. 198 Thus, once custom is found to apply to a given beach,
then it should automatically apply to all other beaches in the
state.
The common law doctrine of custom offers an intriguing opportunity to restrict the freedom with which private landowners can
alienate public rights in certain property. As the essence of the
doctrine is the "understandings of our citizens," 199 custom would
appear to be one of the Lucas Court's "background principles of
property" that "inhere[s] in the title itself."200 As such, it could be
used where applicable to support "measures newly enacted by the
State in legitimate exercise of its police powers"201 on property
impressed with a customary usufruct. Unfortunately, the use of
custom is inhibited both by limitations in the doctrine itself, and
by its current narrow acceptance in this country. The public trust
doctrine, as the next section illustrates, is considerably more versatile.

197. Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (holding that denial of a
permit to build seawall was not taking where public right to use an ocean beach was
established by custom). See also Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990) (holding that requiring owner to remove
obstacles to access beach under terms of Open Beaches Act not taking, since Act involved
enforcement of easements previously acquired through prescription, dedication, and custom).
198. See Starr, Coastal Land, supra note 71, at 143 (citing Thornton, 462 P.2d at
675-76 (holding that established custom can be proven with reference to larger region)).
This feature lessens the burden on the state by avoiding expensive tract-by-tract litigation.
See id. But see McDonald, 780 P.2d 714 (limiting geographic reach of Thornton to
similarly situated beaches); Hoff, Public Beach Access, supra note 187, at 1058 (enforcement requires litigation on tract-by-tract basis, resulting in haphazard and costly enforcement of public rights).
199. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
200. Id. at 2900.
201. Id. at 2899.
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2. The Public Trust Doctrine202

The public trust doctrine is a controversiaF03 common law
property concept that treats tidelands and certain other lands and
waters 204 as "held in trust" for the citizens of various states, and
requires that they be used only for the public's interests. The
California Supreme Court explained the broader meaning of this
responsibility in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court:
[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to
use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of
the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right
202. Although many articles have been written on the public trust doctrine, the
definitive work remains Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natllral Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public
Trust]. But see Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's
Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection and Some Dark Thoughts on the
Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209 passim (1991) (criticizing Sax's work
as forestalling more promising approaches). For an exhaustive list of other articles on
public trust (and a highly critical look at the doctrine itself), see Lloyd R. Cohen, The
Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 239 n.1 (1992) ,
[hereinafter Cohen, Economic Perspective]. For an even more voluminous list, see Valerie
B. Spalding, The Pearl in the Oyster: The Public Trust Doctrine in North Carolina, 12
CAMPBELL L. REv. 23, 24 n.4 (1989) [hereinafter Spalding, Pearl].
203. Professor Wilkinson gives two basic reasons for the intensity of debate over
the public trust doctrine: first, the doctrine focuses on water-based property, which is
among the most valued of our natural resources in both economic and conservation terms;
second, the manner in which the doctrine's application causes a "quick collision between
two treasured sets of expectancy interests-private property owners and the general
public." Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 426 (1989) [hereinafter
Wilkinson, Headwaters].
204. Courts have long recognized the special status of water rights:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a state to maintain the rivers
that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts
upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose
of turning them to more perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent
wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as population grows ....
The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights of lower
owners, but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one
of the great foundations of public welfare and health.
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908), quoted in Helen Ingram
& Cy R. Oggins, The Public Trust Doctrine and Community Values in Water, 32 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 515, 527-28 (1992).
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of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that
right is consistent with the purposes of the trust ....205
The doctrine is most often applied to coastal or riparian land
resources.Z 06 Over time, the doctrine has served as both a source of
and a limitation on state legislative and ·administrative powers over
such lands. 207 Both of these public trust functions are considered
essential underpinnings of a responsible government. As a Wisconsin court put it:
The legislature has no more authority to emancipate itself from
the obligation resting upon it which was assumed at the commencement of its statehood, to preserve for the benefit of all
the people forever, the enjoyment of the navigable waters within
its boundaries, than it has to donate the school fund or the state
capital to a private purpose.208
Unlike custom, the doctrine of public trust has shown enormous vitality and flexibility209 in the modern era.210 The Lucas
decision could give the doctrine even more prominence, 211 as public
205. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
724 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
206. See, e.g., id. (holding that public trust doctrine imposes duty on state to
consider trust uses in allocating water resources).
207. The public trust doctrine will cause a court to "look with considerable
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate a
resource [held available for the general public] to more restricted uses or to subject public
uses to the self-interest of private parties." Sax, Public Trust, supra note 202, at 490; see
also Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 671, 694-96 (1991) (discussing authorizing and limiting powers of public
trust doctrine).
208. Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896),
aff'd on reh'g, 79 N.W. 780, 781 (Wis. 1899) (voiding state law authorizing draining of
lake for private development).
209. At least one scholar has complained that this flexibility, brought about by the
zeal and imagination of the doctrine's proponents, has taken public trust well beyond its
legal roots in property, thereby upsetting public expectations. See James L. Huffman, A
Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL.
L. 527 (1989) [hereinafter Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine].
210. Its continued strength is clearly evident; the public trust doctrine has been
identified as a principle vehicle for the ongoing reformulation of American property law.
See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1269,
1289-90 (1993); Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra note 147.
211. But see Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 713-16. Professor
Lazarus argues that the public trust doctrine has been weakened by_ recent Supreme Court
decisions, particularly Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Land Comm'n, 466 U.S.
198 (1984). See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 692 n.368. But several
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trust principles may well be employed by government regulators 212
in their attempts to justify their actions under the Lucas takings rule. 213

a. Origins2 14 and Some Modem Uses of the Public Trust
Doctrine
The public trust doctrine's origins date back to Roman law,
which held that the air, the streams and rivers, the sea, and the
shoreline were common to all, and that everyone had an equal right
to their use. 215 More recently, English common law gave these
resources to the King, 216 but impressed upon regal ownership the
duty to hold them for the people.217
bases of his argument-current takings jurisprudence and liberalized views of state
declarations of police power authority-have been called into question by the Court in its
Lucas decision. See id. at 675-76.
212. See, e.g., Kreiter v. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 325 (1992) (holding that state's denial of private dock on land held in
public trust not taking for which private owner may be compensated).
213. Potential employment of the doctrine to prevent alienation of trust property for
private use and to bolster governmental regulatory authority over certain property, such as
coastal areas and tidelands, has caused anxiety among some commentators. See Lazarus,
Changing Concepts, supra note 115 (public trust doctrine obscures analysis and makes
reworking of natural resources law more difficult); Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra
note 202, at 276 ("[R]esurrection and transformation of the ancient English public trust
doctrine into a device to abrogate private property rights is a piece of disingenuous
gimmickry which does its champions no honor.").
214. For a thorough discussion of the origins of the public trust doctrine, see
Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115. See also Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine,
supra note 209 (origins found in property, not trust, constitutional or some other legal
taxonomy); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American
Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515 (1989) (public trust is fundamental doctrine in American
property law, assuming in some states character of implied constitutional principle);
Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A
Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573 (1989) (doctrine rooted in
state constitutions). For a more critical view, see Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra note
202, at 275 (modem public trust doctrine rests on inapposite English precedent).
215. THE INsTITUTES OF JusTINIAN 67-70 (T. Coopered. & G. Harris trans., 1812),
cited in Brent R. Austin, Comment, The Public Trust Misapplied: Phiiiips Petroleum v.
Mississippi and the Need to Rethink an Ancient Doctrine, 16 EcoLOGY L. Q. 967, 969
n.10 (1989) [hereinafter Austin, Public Trust]. But see Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra
note 202, at 249-51 (suggesting that public trust doctrine advocates have "an exaggerated
notion of the extent of communal rights in Roman law and practice").
216. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 635. Professor Cohen
points out that the English public trust doctrine acted as a constraint only on private
property owned by the King for his own benefit. Therefore, he finds the "original
motivation of the doctrine" to be "completely inapposite to our modern republican form
of government," in which there is no need to distinguish between property held by the
government for the benefit of the governed and that held for the benefit of the governors,
as the latter category is a "null set:' See Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra note 202, at 252.
217. A description of those public trust rights in English common law that were
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After the American Revolution, the thirteen former colonies
inherited the public trust doctrine among many other legal principles.218 The doctrine of public trust passed to new states219 of the
Union under the Equal Footing Doctrine. 220 As the new country's
boundaries pushed south and west, Spanish, Mexican, and French
law exerted their influence on the shape of American public trust
doctrine. 221 By the late 1880s, the doctrine had significantly expanded from its Roman and English roots. 222

passed on to 18th-century American legal scholars can be found in Sir Matthew Hale's De
Jure Maris and De Portibus Maris and in his explication of public rights in royal and
private property. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at" 24-27; see also Lazarus, Changing
Concepts, supra note 115, at 636 (for more information on Hale's contribution to American
public trust theory).
218. Susan D. Baer, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool to Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 385, 389 (1988); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1894) (citing
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-11 (1842)). But see Paul S. Reinsch, The
English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, cited in 31 BULL. OF THE U. OF
Wis.: EcoN., PoL. Sci., AND HisT. SERIES 393, 400 (1899) (explaining that "the legal
theory of transfer'' of English common law to the colonies was far from linear).
219. Prior to each state's incorporation, its submerged lands were held in trust by
the federal government. Once the titles to such lands were vested in a state, all federal
sovereignty over them was extinguished. See Austin, Public Trust, supra note 215, at
969-70; see also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198,
205 (1984).
220. Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, each state succeeded on an equal footing
with all others to the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain. See Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845); see also Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935); Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) (states admitted into Union after adoption of Constitution
granted same rights as original States in tide waters and lands below high water mark);
Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203, at 444-45 nn.81-82; Carol Kamm, Note, Public
Trust, Farmland Protection and the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act: Red Hill
Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 811, 823 n.68 (1991).
221. In Spanish and Mexican law, the public trust doctrine extended not only to
tidelands, but also to pueblo common lands and to fresh waters flowing through the pueblo.
"The pueblo water-rights doctrine holds that American cities that originated as Spanish
pueblos have a paramount right to use water naturally occurring within the old pueblo
limits to supply the needs of the city and its inhabitants." SELVIN, supra note 18, at 219.
The doctrine was enunciated as early as 1881, in Feliz v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal.
73, 78-80 (1881), and was used as recently as 1975 by Los Angeles to enjoin San
Fernando from extracting water underlying Los Angeles. See City of Los Angeles v. City
of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975). See generally SELVIN, supra note 18, at 219-25.
In the last few decades it has been applied in New Mexico as well. See Cartwright v.
Public Service Co., 343 P.2d 654 (1959) (incorporating doctrine of pueblo water rights
into New Mexico's jurisprudence). The implications of this doctrine for public trust
jurisprudence in California and New Mexico will be the subject of a future article by the
author of this Article.
222. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 147. During this period state courts sanctioned
not only the devolution of trust properties into private ownership (provided the states did
not relinquish regulatory control), but also uses of trust property far beyond those
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In the early days of this country, the public trust doctrine was
most often used to prevent states from alienating publicly held
resources to private interests.223 Its application widened during the
nineteenth century, reflecting the changes in the country's economic and physical conditions. 224 Since the publication in 1970 of
Professor Sax's vanguard article on the subject,225 the public trust
doctrine has become newly prominent in environmental litigation,226
particularly at the state level. 227 Modern uses of the doctrine by
private228 and public229 litigants have included preventing state and
federal governments230 from transferring title over publicly held

contemplated by Lord Hale, Blackstone, or Joseph Angell, in order to further the nation's
economic growth and changing political and economic needs. See id. at 148-50.
223. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (applying public
trust doctrine to block private claim to shellfish beds); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225 (1894)
(applying public trust doctrine to block conveyance of Lake Michigan lakebed to private
railroad); see also Johanna Searle, Note, Private Property Rights Yield to the Environ·
mental Crisis: Perspective on the Public Trust Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. REV. 897 (1990).
224. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 5 (19th-century courts fashioned property law
in general, and public trust doctrine in particular, to expedite economic growth).
225. Sax, Public Trust, supra note 202.
226. A major reason for the doctrine's resurgence is that it seems to enable litigants
to sidestep the Takings Clause. James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through
the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J.
LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 171, 189-92 (1987) [hereinafter Huffman, Myth of Public Rights].
227. Several states have recognized the applicability of the public trust doctrine to
coastal resources. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988);
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); see also Charles
M. Naselsky, Note, Public Trust Doctrine-Beach Access, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 344
(1985).
228. One of the more famous public trust cases brought by a nongovernmental
litigant is National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (applying public trust doctrine to prevent Los
Angeles from draining non-tidal tributaries of navigable lake).
229. Courts generally affirm government reliance on the public trust doctrine to
justify the exercise of authority over natural resources. States have successfully used the
doctrine to acquire standing to seek injunctive relief for the protection of trust resources,
Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 279 A.2d 388, 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971), appeal
after remand, 299 A.2d 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 413
(Wis. 1974); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md. 1972) (halting
quarry in wetland under public trust doctrine), or to sue for monetary relief. State Dep't
of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972);
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671,
673-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976). One
court even allowed the doctrine to be used to eliminate any laches challenge to a state
enforcement action. See Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Board, 439 P.2d 575,
578 (Or. 1968). But see Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (holding that
public trust doctrine does not eliminate need to comply with federal statute of limitations).
230. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(government has duty through public trust to protect national parks). For some general
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resources, and halting the conversion of trust property from one
use to another. 231
The public trust doctrine has developed at the state level232
without interference by the U.S. Supreme Court.233 The first reported judicial application of the doctrine in this country was in
1810, when a Pennsylvania court employed the public trust rationale to deny a private claim to fishing rights in the Susquehanna
River. 234 Several similar cases in the original thirteen states quickly
followed suit. 235
The "lodestar'' 236 Supreme Court case applying the public trust
doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois. 231 In that case,
insights into the federal public trust doctrine, see Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203,
at 454-64; J. Wallace Malley, Jr. & Jeffrey M. Silverstein, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Federal Condemnation: A Call for Recognition of a Federal Common Law, 15 VT. L. REv.
501, 519-29 (1991); Baer, supra note 218. See also In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp.
38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (public trust gives state right to sue vessel owner for oil spill
damage); United States v. 1.8 Acres, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981) (public trust
in land below low water mark must be preserved).
231. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass.
1986) (preventing state from converting public park into ski resort).
232. Most of the states that recognize the public trust doctrine have been riparian
doctrine states (e.g., lllinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin). Some Western prior
appropriation doctrine states recognize it as well, including California, Idaho, Montana,
North Dakota, and Washington. Other states recognize the doctrine statutorily, such as
Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. See Peter N. Davis, Protecting Waste
Assimilation Streamjlows by the Law of Water Allocation, Nuisance, and Public Trust, and
by Environmental Statutes, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 357, 378-79 nn.117-19 (1988) [hereinafter Davis, Environmental Statutes]; see also infra note 241.
233. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
But see Summa Corp. v. California ex rei. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984)
(rejecting state's trusteeship claim in tidelands originating in private Mexican land grants
because state failed to assert trusteeship rights during federal patent hearings).
234. See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810) (extending the application of the
public trust doctrine to fresh inland waters); see also Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co.,
14 Serg. & Rawle 71, 79 (Pa. 1826); SELVIN, supra note 18, at 33-36, and cases cited
therein.
235. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Mass. (1 Cush.) 53 (1851) (applying
doctrine to limit ability of riparian proprietors to construct wharves impeding public's right
of free passage); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (applying doctrine to
pre-Revolutionary grant of title to oyster bed). For a discussion of early state public trust
cases, see NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC TRUST ENFORCEMENT 7-15 (1977).
236. See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 202, at 489; see also Wilkinson, Headwaters,
supra note 203, at 450 ("Justice Stephen J. Field's opinion ... belongs on any short list
of great natural resource opinions.").
237. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). After this decision, many states issued similar rulings.
See, e.g., State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 648 (Fla. 1893) (holding that
state cannot transfer navigable waters and soil beneath them, but must hold them for public
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Justice Field applied the doctrine to void a grant of a portion of
the Lake Michigan lakebed: 238 "Such abdication is not consistent
with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of
the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public."239
Illinois Central remains one of the most comprehensive statements
of the public trust doctrine. 240
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the
public trust doctrine241 can be found in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, in which the Court reaffirmed the state's ownership of
non-navigable tidelands and impressed upon those lands a trust
obligation to be exercised on behalf of the public. 242 One of the
navigation and fishing); Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895) (concluding that
private title in lands between high and low water marks on navigable streams subject to
right of public use); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918,
922 (Wis. 1896) (holding that state's right in navigable lakebed is held in trust for public
navigation and fishing; state has no proprietary interest, and cannot abdicate trust in
relation to these lands); People v. Russ, 64 P. 111, 112 (Cal. 1901) (asserting that right
of private landowner to reclaim swampland subject to public right to use of stream for
tranportation). But see Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 383-84, 399 (1926)
(state legislature under state law could grant tidal lands free of public rights by buying
title back). For a discussion of these cases, see Huffman, Myth of Public Rights, supra
note 226, at 195-96.
238. For a more detailed parsing of Illinois Central than is generally given to the
case by public trust scholars, see Huffman, Myth of Public Rights, supra note 226, at
193-95.
239. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
240. An earlier, equally strong judicial articulation of the public trust doctrine was
set out in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Mass. (1 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851).
241. Although Phillips was the last decision to address the doctrine, other cases
have raised similar issues. The recent release of the Marshall papers revealed an unpublished dissent by Justice Brennan in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
825 (1987), in which he proposed using public trust to justify the state's exercise of
regulatory power:
The California constitution codifies a right whose genesis may be traced back
to Roman law; the public's right of access to the sea. The State has adopted
a regulatory scheme intended to preserve this longstanding public expectation
in the face of increasingly intensive development along the California coast.
As a result, no landowner in the coastal zone has any reasonable expectation
of a right to use property in such a way as to deny the public access to the
ocean.
Justice Brennan, unpublished dissent drafted for Nollan 1 (on file with the Harvard
Environmental Law Review).
242. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Phillips was written by Justice White. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred. The case drew a
vigorous dissent from Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Scalia, principally because this was
the first time the court had recognized a state's public trust title to non-navigable water.
ld. at 485. The dissent also expressed concern for the property expectations of petitioners
and thousands of other similarly situated landowners who believed they held valid title.
Id. at 493.
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more significant aspects of the Court's ruling was its adoption of
an "ebb and flow" test to expand the application of the public trust
doctrine to tidal limits of waterways, and its rejection of the narrower standard of navigability.243
Today, the public trust doctrine is "the settled law of this
country." 244 Some states have codified the public trust doctrine in
their constitutions245 or in legislation,Z46 while others have relied on
the courts to develop the doctrine.247
The modem public trust doctrine is based on the premise that
the sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in perpetuity248 for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The
243. The case potentially extends the public trust doctrine to wetlands adjacent to
non-tidal tributaries of tidal rivers as long as there is an ultimate connection to the sea:
Admittedly, there is a difference in degree between the waters in this case,
and non-navigable waters on the seashore that are affected by the tide. But
there is no difference in kind. For in the end, all tide waters are connected to
the sea; the waters in this case, for example, by a navigable tidal river. Perhaps
the lands at issue here differ in some ways from tidelands directly adjacent
to the sea; nonetheless, they still share those "geographical, chemical and
environmental" qualities that make lands beneath tidal waters unique.

Phillips, 484 U.S. at 481 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). For a discussion of the significance of this language, see
Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 375.
244. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 443 (1892). For a discussion of the doctrine's
particular importance to western rivers, see Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203, at
472.
245. See, e.g., CAL. CoNST. art. X, § 3 (restricting sale of certain tidelands), § 4
(protecting public access to tidelands and navigable waters), art. I, § 25 (reserving in the
people absolute right to fish and restricting sale of state lands along navigable waters).
For a more detailed description of California's public trust doctrine, see Ted J. Hannig,
The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983).
246. The South Carolina Beachfront Management Act challenged by Lucas sought
to withdraw the common law property right of private owners up to the high water mark.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 (Law. Co-op. 1989) This amounted to an exercise of public
trnst jurisdiction over those lands.
247. For differing opinions on the wisdom of the judicial activism that has accompanied the growth of the public trust doctrine, compare Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra
note 115, at 712-13 (arguing that long-term weakness of public trust, which counsels
abandonment thereof, is its implicit assumption that the judiciary is in the best position
to safeguard environmental concerns) with Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203, at
466-70 (arguing that judges can be expected to employ old and honored notions of
trusteeship in order to fulfill public's interests and expectations). See also Sax, Public
Trust, supra note 202, at 509 (public trust law is a technique by which courts may mend
perceived imperfections in legislative and administrative process).
248. The state retains an interest in trust lands even after they are given or sold to
private parties, until they are so altered that their value as trust resources is substantially
destroyed. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 373 (Cal. 1980); National
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sovereign cannot alienate trust property to the detriment of its
citizens,249 except upon express approval by the legislature, 250 and
only upon a legislative finding that the conveyance is in furtherance
of the public interest or will not destroy the public's interest in the
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (holding that state has power as administrator of public trust
to revoke previously granted rights or enforce trust against lands long thought free of
trust); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State Lands Comm'n, No. C-663-010 (Super. Ct.
Los Angeles County 1990), cited in Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine
in Washington, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 671, 686 n.93 (1991) (applying doctrine to
sustain state denial of permits to locate offshore platforms on tidelands even though
permittee held leases on lands); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492
So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Board of Trustees
of Int'l Improvement Trust Fund of Florida, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (invoking public trust
doctrine to invalidate sovereignty over lands mistakenly conveyed into private ownership
during 19th century as swamp and overflowed lands); State v. Mcilroy, 595 S.W.2d 659,
664-65 (Ark. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980) (holding that freshwater streams
are subject to public rights under newly promulgated recreational test of navigability),
cited in Ausness, Wild Dunes, supra note 109, at 440 n.25. Bill see Cohen, Economic
Perspective, supra note 202 (communal property rights lying dormant inside some erstwhile private property right waiting for judicial discovery and vindication undercuts secure
and predictable rights in property).
249. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also Appleby v. City
of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (compensating private owners for waterfront lots
previously granted to them by New York State and subsequently taken by New York City
on ground that intent to alienate public trust is clear and in public interest). According to
Selvin, People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71 (1877) (holding that
state can alienate its title in tidelands but not divest itself of paramount right of public to
free navigability around piers) foreshadowed Illinois Central. SELVIN, supra note 18, at
119-20. But see Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1022 (1988) (holding that express legislation does not abrogate public trust over tidelands,
as state legislature has no authority to sell or abdicate state sovereignty over tidelands,
and trust not relinquished by transfer of property); Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 351
(1859) (affirming state's authority to alienate not only its title in coastal tidelands but also
its regulatory authority over those lands), cited in SELVIN, supra note 18, at 119.
The extent to which a state can alienate trust resources has been the subject of debate
among public trust scholars. See, e.g., Huffman, Myth of Public Rights, supra note 226,
at 192-96 (criticizing public trust cases following Illinois Central as ignoring state's
ability to alienate trust resources); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine: A
Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989) (stating
that in some states, the public trust doctrine, like the Equal Footing Doctrine, has assumed
character of implied constitutional doctrine, immunizing it from legislative abolition).
250. The origins of the legislature's ability to alienate trust lands can probably be
traced to Joseph Angell's 1826 book on tidelands, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY
IN THE WATERS AND IN THE SoiL, AND SHORES THEREOF at 106-07, cited in Rose, Comedy
of the Commons, supra note 17, at 735-36. See also SELVIN, supra note 18, at 36-38. For
an extreme instance of the legislature's ability to alienate the public trust, see Hart v.
Burnett, 15 Cal. 530 (1860) (sustaining the transfer of San Francisco's title to several
thousand acres of the downtown area to private owners). According to Se1vin, Hart was
an important first step in the assimilation of the public trust doctrine into Californian and
American jurisprudence as an instrument for resource allocation. SELVIN, supra note 18,
at 172. For a discussion of early cases restricting a state's ability to alienate trust resources,
see id. at 63-150 (alienation of trust property occurred throughout 19th century to facilitate

1995]

Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches

45

remaining resources. 251 The courts strictly scrutinize state alienation of trust property.252
Most states hold that the public trust doctrine acts to restrict
government actions that adversely affect trust resources, 253 and a
few states have held that it imposes an affirmative obligation on
states to preserve trust resources for use by the public.254 The
doctrine has been used to provide a basis for states' authority to
protect natural resources on privately owned lands and waters255
and to impose additional affirmative duties on states with respect
to those resources.256 For example, the public trust doctrine has
economic growth as long as legislatures retained regulatory control over property's use
and insured legitimate public access).
251. See Paepcke v. Public Building Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); City of Ber~eley v. Superior
Court, 606 P.2d 362, 369 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
252. See, e.g., Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d at 369 (asserting that statutes
abandoning public trust must be strictly construed, intent to abandon must be clearly
expressed or necessarily implied, and statute should be given interpretation retaining
public's interest in tidelands). It is ironic that the public trust doctrine requires strict
scrutiny of state alienation of public interests in trust lands and that the Lucas opinion
uses strict scrutiny to review state actions that restrict private property rights in the face
of public claims.
253. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 650-55, 650 n.112.
254. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (applying public
trust doctrine to disallow conveyance of Lake Michigan lakebed to private railroad).
255. See Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 59 S.E.2d 132
(S.C. 1950) (holding that any ownership in lands below high water mark is subject to
regulatory control of government), overruled on other grounds sub nom. McCall v. Batson,
329 S.E.2d 741 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing doctrine of sovereign immunity); see also Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. at 459 (stating that people hold soil under navigable waters in trust for
common use as a portion of their inherent sovereignty, and any legislative act affecting
use of trust lands affects public welfare and is within exercise of state's police power).
For a highly critical analysis of the use of the public trust doctrine as a source of
authorization for state regulatory power, see Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note
209, at 556-60 (positing that greatest distortion of historical purposes of public trust
doctrine occurs when considering doctrine as source of authority for state regulation).
256. Many articles have been written exploring potential uses of the public trust
doctrine to protect important natural resources that might otherwise go unprotected. See,
e.g., Daniel G. Kagan, Private Rights and the Public Trust: Opposing Lakeshore Funnel
Development, 15 ENVTL. AFF. 105 (1987) (preventing overbuilding on lakefront property);
Catherine R. Hall, Dockominiums: In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine, 24 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 331 (1990) (halting incursion of dockominiums on public trust shoreland);
Heather J. Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 ENVTL. AFF.,
839 (1984) (protecting Massachusetts' inland areas); Hoff, Public Beach Access, supra
note 187 (strengthening police power analysis of legitimacy of Coastal Commission beach
exactions); Anthony R. Chase & Gina M. Lambert, Remedying CERCLA's Natural Resource
Damages Provisions: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine into Natural Resource
Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 353 (1992) (integrating state public trust doctrine
into natural resource damage assessment process); Davis, Environmental Statt:tes, supra
note 232, at 378 (mentioning the public trust doctrine as one of several tools to preserve
sufficient streamflow for waste assimilation); Casey Jarman, The Public Trust Doctrine in
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been used to force a state to identify impacts on public trust waters
as part of the planning process257 and to regulate those waters
affirmatively for the benefit of the public's right to use them. 258 The
doctrine has been applied to condition a water right held by Los
Angeles so that the city would leave sufficient water instream for
fish and wildlife. 259 It has provided a basis for sustaining a local
ordinance requiring a permit to fill marshlands, stating:
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change
the essential natural character of this land so as to use it for a
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which
injures the rights of others. 26o

The public trust doctrine, unlike common law nuisance, does
not require the courts to balance public and private interests. 261
Once a public trust interest is found in property on behalf of the
the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 OR. L. REV. 1 (1986) (enhancing United States stewardship over resources in EEZ); Michael L. Wolz, Note, Application of the Public Trust
Doctrine to the Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can It Fill the Statutory Gaps?,
6 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 475 (1992) (preventing diversion of water flowing into wetlands);
Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 485
(1989) (regulating nonpoint source pollution); Peter A. Fahmy, Note, The Public Trust
Doctrine as a Source of State Reserved Water Rights, 63 DEN. U. L. REV. 585 (1986)
(creating state reserved water rights).
257. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) (stating that the public trust doctrine can be used to prohibit
issuance of water appropriation permits for energy production facilities until comprehensive, state-wide water use plan developed).
258. See Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952), aff'd on
reh'g, 55 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. 1952) (applying public trust doctrine to commit fishing stream
to power generation purposes).
259. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Note also that the court included language
which presaged and preempted the possibility of a takings challenge: "(The public trust]
authority ... bars [any party] from claiming a vested right to divert water once it becomes
clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the public trust." !d. at 712.
260. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (holding that
shoreland zoning ordinance preserves nature, environment, and natural resources as they
were created, a state of affairs to which the people have a present right).
261. Courts occasionally require, however, that public trust uses be balanced. See,
e.g., National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d 709 (requiring that state include explicit balancing
test of consumptive and non-consumptive trust uses), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983);
lllinois Cent. R.R. v. lllinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); Superior Public Rights, Inc. v.
State Dep't of Natural Resources, 263 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
state should balance water-related trust interests and other interests). See also Davis,
Environmental Statutes, supra note 232, at 381 n.l33. For a contrary view which argues
that courts are not equipped to engage in the balancing process of public lands decisionmaking, see Steven M. Jawetz, Comment, Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law:
Ineffective-And Undesirable-Judicial Intervention, 10 EcOLOGY L.Q. 455, 469-71 (1982).
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sovereign, that interest is dominant over any private interests. Therefore, in a state with lands impressed by the common law doctrine
of public trust, any clash between public and private interests in
those lands will be resolved in favor of the sovereign, extinguishing private rights in those lands.262
The public trust doctrine has expanded and metamorphosed in
response to changing economic and social conditions as well as to
changes in social values. 263 This should not be surprising, as "property law has always been functional, encouraging behavior compatible with contemporary goals of the economy."264 Thus, modem
courts have expanded both the geographic range of the doctrine265
262. See, e.g., Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 59 S.E.2d
132 (1950), overruled on other grounds, McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). See
infra part III.B.2.c.
263. Several scholars have recommended further expansion of the doctrine to bring
it more into synchronization with the basic laws of ecology. See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra
note 210, at 1289-90 (arguing that number of settings in which legal concept of public
trust are applied should be greatly increased); Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra note
147 (explaining various theoretical bases for expansion of public trust doctrine to protect
naturally functioning systems); Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1454
(arguing that property definitions have always been functional and dynamic).
264. Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1446-48. See also Richard A.
Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 747, 751 (1990) (discussing need to create
new forms of property to respond to emergence of new technological possibilities such as
broadcast frequencies, patents, copyrights, and corporate shares).
265. See, e.g., Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972) (public
access to and use of dry sand beach); State of California v. Lyon, 29 Cal.3d 210 (1981);
and State v. Superior Court of Placer County, 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 865 (1981) (lands between high and low water in non-tidal, navigable lakes and
streams); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (non-navigable tributary of navigable stream);
City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840
(1980) (privately owned tidelands in San Francisco Bay); Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands); Robbins v. Dept. of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577
(Mass. 1969) (wetlands); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass.
1966) (parkland); Sierra Club v. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.Supp. 90 (N.D. Ca. 1974)
(parkland); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont.
1984) (streambeds); Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl.
Resources, 341 A.2d 556 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (sand and gravel in streambeds);
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973)
(historic battlefield); Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (wildlife);
Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 340 N.W.2d 722
(Wis. 1983) (downtown area). For a comprehensive list of these and other cases, see Scott
W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107 (1986).
The doctrine, however, is not without limits. See, e.g., Mamolella v. First Bank, 423
N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that doctrine does not apply to alley
adjoining junk yard); Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 372 A.2d 1133, 1136 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1977), modified, 393 A.2d 579 (N.J. 1978) (holding that doctrine does not
apply to man-made showers and bathhouses on seashore); Evans v. City of Johnstown,
410 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that doctrine does not apply to pollution from
sewage treatment).
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and the resources to which it applies, expanding it even into upland
areas from its watery base.266 The list of protected trust interests has
also grown to cover recreation, scientific research, and scenic viewing.267 Preservation of trust resources in their natural state has been
held to be an appropriate public purpose protected by the doctrine. 268
There is growing public recognition that one of the most
important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed
within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in
their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for
scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. It is not
necessary to here define precisely all the public uses which
encumber the tidelands. 269
266. Professor Coh~n finds no comfort in arguments based on either analogy or
efficiency for the journey of the doctrine from tidelands to rivers and streams, let alone
to inland ponds and mountains. See Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra note 202, at
254-63. But see the following authors, each of whom propounds a theoretical basis for
applying the public trust doctrine to those resources: Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra
note 17; Starr, Coastal Land, supra note 71; Mary Kyle McCurdy, Public Trust Protection
for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683 (1989); Fred R. Disheroon, After Lucas: No More Wetlands
Takings?, 17 VT. L. REv. 683 (1993); Michael L. Wolz, Note, Applications of the Public
Trust Doctrine to the Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can It Fill the Statlltory
Gaps?, 6 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 475 (1992) [hereinafter Wolz, Statutory Gaps].
267. While the doctrine traditionally applied to navigation, commerce, and fishing,
over time the courts have recognized a broader range of public uses of trust resources.
See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (recreational, scientific, aesthetic
uses); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952) (recreational uses and
enjoyment of scenic beauty); Diana Shooting Club v. Rusting, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914)
(hunting and fishing over navigable waters); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.
1893) (sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, skating, and domestic, agricultural, and city water
needs); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 271 N.W.2d 69
(Wis. 1978) (use of pesticides in urban lakes); Orion Corp. v. Washington, 747 P.2d 1062,
1073 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988) (navigation, fishing, swimming,
water skiing, and other related recreational purposes); Mayor & Mun. Council of Clifton
V. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760 (N.J. Sup. 1987) (distribution of proceeds
from water supply company); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n,
452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984) (state decisions implementing hazardous waste law). See also
Austin, Public Trust, supra note 215, at 1009-18 (public interest in trust lands, rather than
type of land, should be used to define doctrine's boundaries). For an illuminating
discussion on whether recreational uses support a right of public access to waterways and
their shores under the public trust doctrine, see Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note
17, at 753-58.
268. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). See also State of
Cal. v. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d 240, 247 (1981) (holding that areas of shorezone protected by
public trust for recreational and ecological purposes subject to overuse can be closed to
public bathing); State of Cal. v. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 216 (1981) (concluding that
fast-disappearing resource of great importance for ecology and recreational needs of state's
residents was protected by public trust doctrine).
269. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).

1995]

Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches

49

The public trust doctrine should qualify as a background principle of property law in the many jurisdictions in which it has long
been used for a variety of environmentally protective purposes. The
controversiality of both the doctrines of public trust and custom
could, however, preclude their application to wetlands and barrier
beaches unless their doctrinal underpinnings in thoses areas are
sufficiently strong to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
b. A Solid Doctrinal Foundation Exists for Applying Custom
and Public Trust to Wetlands and Barrier Beaches

Looking at coastal and wetland resources through a common
law lens, one can see how their destruction creates a public, and
in some cases, a private nuisance. The harms that ensue-flooding,
loss of water supply for drinking, agricultural, or industrial purposes, and loss of livelihood through destruction of species-are
classic nuisance injuries270 which can be avoided by preventing the
destructive activity.271 Government regulation aimed at protecting
these resources should therefore be able to rely on the common
law of nuisance. Judicial precedent abounds; common law doctrine
is on sound footing.
Despite the characteristics and use of these lands,272 controversy surrounds the applicability of the custom and public trust
doctrines to barrier beaches and wetlands. Although the doctrines
270. See supra part liLA.
271. But see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 10-11 (starting assumption of
nuisance-that detrimental uses of land may not be socially intolerable or blameworthythrough balancing process will allow detrimental uses).
272. Barrier beaches and wetlands areas are classic public trust resources. They are
essential for fish spawning as well as for shellfish beds, boating, timbering, oil and gas
production, and recreation, to name just a few traditional public trust purposes. Other uses
of these resources, such as freshwater supply, birdwatching, photography, hiking, and
scientific study have also been recognized as protected public trust uses. See Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (acknowledging growing public recognition that one
of the most important uses of tidelands is preservation in their natural state to accommodate scientific study and to provide habitats for birds and marine life). Wetlands provide
commercially valuable products such as fish, shellfish, rice, and cranberries as well as
opportunities of commercial value, such as recreation. See supra note 131. The fact that
wetlands control erosion and sedimentation makes them essential to navigation as well.
ld. See also EDWIN H. CLARK II ET AL., THE EONSERVATION FOUNDATION, ERODING
SoiLS: THE OFF-FARM IMPACTS 82-84 (1985) (sedimentation occurring in harbors, bays,
and navigation channels reduces capacity of these facilities to handle commercial and
recreational crafts, increases likelihood of shipping accidents, and requires expensive
dredging to keep facilities usable).
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have successfully been applied to the former, no cases or articles
could be found extending the doctrine of custom to wetlands.273
Neither custom nor the public trust doctrine was considered part
of the historic public trust, which focused narrowly on navigable
waters. 274 The fact that state courts have redrawn the boundaries of
the public trust doctrine with abandon, even leaving the doctrine's
watery base entirely,275 does not eliminate the need for caution. The
controversy surrounding the use of these doctrines may make any
further expansion of them suspect. 276 Unless a firm doctrinal foundation can be placed under the application of these doctrines to
Wetlands and barrier beaches are also classic trust locales. See supra part III.B.2.a.
The fact that wetlands are often non-navigable is irrelevant for determining the public trust
doctrine's applicability to them. American courts have long abandoned the requirement
that public trust resources be navigable. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469 (1988). As one scholar has opined on the issue of navigability, "the whole
concept of navigability for determining anything other than the floating of a supreme court
opinion should be abandon'ed." Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream
Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 250 n.66 (1980) (paraphrasing
Professor Charles E. Corker of the University of Washington). For a thorough discussion
of the application of the public trust doctrine to wetlands and the relevance of navigability,
see Wolz, Statutory Gaps, supra note 266, at 485-87.
As noted elsewhere in this Article, the doctrine of custom has long applied to barrier
beaches. Supra part ill.B.l. Recently, the public trust doctrine has been applied in one
jurisdiction to dry sand beaches as well. See Neptune City v. Avon-By-the-Sea, 294 A.2d
47 (N.J. 1972).
273. Although several articles have been written on the applicability of the public
trust doctrine to coastal and wetland resources, they are not entirely in agreement on how
that is to be accomplished. See, e.g., Fred R. Disheroon, After Lucas: No More Wetland
Takings?, 17 VT. L. REv. 683 (1993) (arguing that doctrines of navigational servitude and
public trust defeat claims of private ownership in wetlands); Mary K. McCurdy, Public
Trust Protection for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683 (1989) (positing that public trust doctrine
applies to wetlands whether navigable or not); Wolz, Statutory Gaps, supra note 266
(stating that public trust doctrine could be used to protect water resources on which
wetlands depend, wildlife dependent on wetlands for continued vitality, or wetland itselO.
For a discussion of the application of both the public trust doctrine and custom to beaches,
see Starr, Coastal Land, supra note 71.
274. See supra part ill.B.2.a.
275. Reed, supra note 265, at 116-17. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note
115, at 649 (doctrine has steadily emerged from watery depths to embrace variety of
upland areas and resources); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc.,
225 A.2d 130 (N.J. 1966) (holding that gas pipeline company was barred from condemning
land devoted to conservation and preservation of wildlife because land devoted to prior
public use); Olmstead v. City of San Diego, 124 Cal. App. 14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932)
(finding that road would seriously interfere with park use); Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d
920, 925 (Ill. App. 1975) (stating that public trust attaches to land conveyed to University
of Illinois "as a forest, wild and plant-life reserve, as an example of landscape gardening
and as a public park"). For an interesting discussion about the use of the concept of
sovereign ownership in trust as a legal basis for economic expansion, as opposed to natural
resource protection, see Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 640-41.
276. For a particularly ascerbic view of the public trust doctrine, see Cohen,
Economic Perspective, supra note 202, at 276:
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coastal and wetland resources, their expanded use to reach these
areas may not survive constitutional scrutiny when confronted with
a countervailing constitutional right. Professor Rose's analysis of
the historical underpinnings of custom and public trust provides a
good starting point for the search for that foundation. 277
Professor Rose explores the doctrinal foundations of both custom and public trust to understand why they have survived in an
era dominated by the concept of private property. In both doctrines
she finds an implicit "longstanding notion" that certain kinds of
property ought to be exempt from the classical economic presumption of exclusive owner control.278 Such property can be owned
collectively and managed by society at large with the public's
claims independent of and superior to any purported claims by
private landowners or governmental managers. She calls this property "inherently public property." 279
Professor Rose has identified commerce as the central object
of early inherently public property doctrines (such as custom and
public trust).280 "Inherently public property," the object of those
ancient doctrines, held out the possibility of infinite "returns to
scale," 281 making the property extremely valuable to eighteenthand nineteenth-century England. 282 But scale returns, or the capacThe resurrection and transformation of the ancient English public trust doctrine into a device to abrogate private property rights is a piece of disingenuous gimmickry which does its champions no honor. The public trust doctrine
has been retrieved from the grave, and like some vampire, transformed into
an obscure and pernicious force that it was not in life. It, and we, would best
be served by reinterring it following a staKe to the heart.
For other articles critical of any extension of the two doctrines, see Huffman, Myth of
Public Rights,' supra note 226 (arguing against mythology of public trust doctrine);
Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 633 (arguing against expansion of
doctrine because it interferes with important process of reworking natural resources law
and provokes clash between private property protection and natural resource preservation goals).
277. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17.
278. Id. at 713.
279. Id. at 720.
280. Id. at 774.
281. Increasing returns to scale, a 19th-century concept used to identify natural
monopolies subject to government ownership or public trust regulation, exist where greater
production can lead to proportionately lower costs per item. According to Professor Rose,
analogies to scale returns can be found in the doctrines of inherently public property (i.e.,
property subject to prescription, public trust authority, or custom), "felicitously expressed
in the phrase, 'the more the merrier."' Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at
767-71. A modern example of scale returns is the telephone, where the tel~phone's value
to the individual increases the more users of the system there are.
282. Id. at 766-74.
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ity to expand wealth, was riot the only feature of commerce in that
era. According to Rose, commerce had educative and socializing
virtues as well. She calls this "doux commerce." 283
The twentieth-century equivalent of "doux commerce," Rose
writes,284 is recreation and properties devoted to recreational uses.
The highest value of these lands is achieved when preserved for
the public at large. 285 The continuing vitality of common law doctrines, like custom and public trust, has as much to do with the
protection of physical locations where recreational activities can
take place, as with commerce or any historical provenance.
For the doctrinal foundations of public trust and custom to be
applicable to wetlands and barrier beaches, these lands must be
perceived as "inherently public property."286 According to Professor
Rose, in order to qualify, (1) the land must be physically capable
of monopolization by private persons, and (2) the public's claim to
the property must be superior to that of the private owner, because
the properties are most valuable when left in their natural state to
benefit an indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons. 287 Wetlands
and barrier beaches would appear to meet both of these criteria.
The pressures on these fast-dwindling resources make them uniquely
susceptible to monopolization by private landowners. 288 And, as
shown infra, their contribution to commerce, both "doux" and mercantile, makes the public's claim to them superior to that of private
landowners.
Pressures on coastal and wetland resources have caused them
to decline significantly in both quantity and quality. Coastal barrier
beaches have fallen to residential, industrial, .and agricultural de283. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 775.
284. /d. at 779.
285. Professor Rieser advances Professor Rose's analysis by finding analogies to
"doux commerce" in ecological preservation. See Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra
note 147, at 402-03.
286. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 720.
287. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 774 (arguing that
property's "publicness" created the "rent" of the property, and public property doctrines
(like public trust and custom) protected that publicly created rent from capture through
private holdout).
288. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571,574 (N.J. 1978) (finding
that state was rapidly approaching crisis as to availability to public of its priceless beach
areas); Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 (N.J. 1972)
(discussing how remaining tidal water resources in state ownership are growing very
scarce because of increased population, while industrial development and recreational
demands increase their importance to public welfare).
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velopment, freshwater demand, and pollution.289 Wetlands have succumbed to ports and marinas, mining, farming, and urban, residential, and industrial development.290 In the United States, coastal
population has risen by 40 million people since 1960.291 Over half
of the United States population now lives within fifty miles of the
shoreline, and the shoreline population continues to grow at four
times the national average growth rate. 292 Wetlands and barrier
beaches are becoming increasingly scarce, and thus vulnerable to
private monopolization or "hold up" by individual landowners. 293
Furthermore, this process of development is devastating to barrier
beaches and wetlands because both of these resouces are most
valuable to the public when left in their natural state.
Professor Rose finds in the educational and socializing values
of "doux commerce" perhaps the greatest "returns to scale" protected by traditional property doctrines,Z94 .and finds in recreation a
modem day surrogate to "doux commerce," the social glue that
holds twentieth-century America together. 295 Both beaches and wetlands offer important public recreational opportunities which they
share with "doux commerce" and offer important educational and
socializing effects that permit us to get along better with each other
and teach us social responsibility. 296
289. See generally STEM1UNG THE TIDE, supra note 133. See also NATIONAL
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 50 YEARS OF POPULATION
CHANGE ALONG THE NATION'S COASTS 1960-2010 (Apr. 1990) (predicting coastal population will grow from 110 million to more than 127 million by 2010).
290. For information on wetland losses, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
WETLANDS: THEIR UsE AND REGULATION (1984); W. FRAYER, T. MONAHAN, D. BOWDEN,
& F. GRAYBILL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS AND
DEEPWATER HABITATS IN THE COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1950's TO 1970's (1983);
STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 133.
291. STEM~fiNG THE TIDE, supra note 133, at 5.
292. See STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 133.
293. Over a period of 200 years, it is estimated that the lower 48 states lost an
estimated 53% of their original wetlands and that, on average, over 60 acres of wetlands
were lost every hour during that period. THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES 1780's TO 1980's 1, 4 (1990). Barrier beaches
were disappearing at a rate of 6000 acres per year by the 1980s. NATIONAL WILDLIFE
FEDERATION, BULWARKS OF SAND •.. OUR VANISHING BARRIER ISLANDS (1980), quoted
in BETH MILLEMANN, AND Two IF BY SEA: FIGHTING THE ATTACK ON AMERICA'S CoASTS
12 (1986).
294. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 775-77.
295. Rose therefore concludes there is nothing surprising in the movement from
commerce to recreation as the major reason to support the "publicness" of certain property
and as a rationale for the use of both custom and public trust. I d. at 779-80.
296. In 1991, approximately 35 million recreational anglers fished for wetland-dependent freshwater, saltwater and shellfish species, 18 million Americans hunted migratory
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Barrier beaches and wetlands thus appear to share many of the
features of inherently public property described by Rose. They are
susceptible to private holdout and promote both the mercantile
interests of" commerce as well as its softer, socializing functions.
This makes the public's claim to them far superior to that of any
individual landowner. The doctrines of custom and public trust,
which preserve the public's claim to these lands in their natural
state, therefore properly apply to both types of property and have
solid doctrinal support.
The discussion up to this point has shown how both custom
and public trust are background principles of property law that
form the basis of our understandings about the bundle of rights
which make up title to private property. Both doctrines have been
used to protect public access to, as well as uses of, certain natural
areas. 297 Although of ancient, and-according to some-suspect
origin, both doctrines have displayed astonishing endurance, and,
in the case of public trust, amazing flexibility and vitality.
The doctrines of custom and public trust are being used in the
context of this Article merely to provide background principles of
common law to support regulatory initiatives protecting wetlands
and barrier beaches. Even in such a supplementary or corollary role
they may, however, generate controversy. This is particularly likely
to be true when the doctrines clash with countervailing property
rights, as in claims under the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Yet this clash is exactly what may happen if
government regulatory and private litigants rely upon these common law doctrines to defend against takings claims by private
landowners now that Lucas has revived common law property doctrines.
and other waterfowl as well as big and small game associated with wetlands, and
30 million of us listed wildlife observation among our recreational pursuits. NATIONAL
AUDUBON SOCIETY, VALUING WETLANDS: THE COST OF DESTROYING AMERICA'S WETLANDS 5-11 (Deanne Kloepfer ed., 1994).
Professor Rieser, in her search for a new theoretical basis for the public trust
doctrine, argues that the ecological integrity of natural resources serves as a modern day
surrogate for 18th- and 19th-century theories of commerce. See Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra note 147.
297. One criticism of the doctrines is that they protect only marginally useful
resources. Another is that the doctrines are reactive, not proactive, and must await some
attempt to convert areas protected by the doctrines before they are invoked. As to the
marginality of the resources, see supra notes 131-133. At least one Justice believes that
the doctrines have prospective force as well. See Justice Brennan's unpublished dissent in
Nol/an v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, supra note 241.
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c. The Intersection of Common Law Property Doctrines and
the Takings Clause29&

The relationship between the public trust doctrine and takings
jurisprudence has been largely unexplored by the courts.299 Few
courts have adjudicated the issue of whether application of the
doctrine will provide a complete defense to a takings claim or,
conversely, whether a state can effect a taking of private property
when, acting under authority of the public trust doctrine, 300 it limits
the use of that property in some way. 301 While there has been only
298. This question is discussed here only.in the context of the public trust doctrine.
While several courts have found that custom is a complete bar to a takings claim, see,
e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (city's denial of permit
to build seawall on oceanfront property does not effect a taking in the face of a claim
based on custom); Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1073 (1990) (holding public easements acquired by custom do not effect a
taking), scholarship to date has raised the issue only in the setting of the public trust
doctrine. Given that both custom and public trust transfer private property into public
hands and create a pre-existing right in the public in those lands, the conclusions reached
in this section with respect to the public trust doctrine should be applicable to custom as
well.
299. The Lucas Court could have avoided the spectral presence of the public trust
doctrine and custom if it had followed more recent takings precedent and retained an
expectational or functional definition of property. Instead, the Court incorporated into its
view of property definitional or historic property concepts like public trust and custom.
See Sax, Western Water, supra note 86, at 944.
300. Several courts have found that custom is a complete bar to a takings claim.
See supra note 298.
301. Such questions have entertained public trust scholars for decades, causing
considerable concern for some:
[T]he [public] trust doctrine threatens to fuel a developing clash in liberal
ideology between furthering individual rights of security and dignity, bound
up in notions of private property protection, and supporting environmental
protection and resource preservation goals, inevitably dependent on intrusive
governmental programs designed to achieve longer-term collectivist goals.
Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 633. See also Huffman, Myth of Public
Rights, supra note 226 (arguing that public interest is better served by adhering to clear
purposes of the Fifth Amendment than by avoiding amendment's· requirements through
mythology of modem doctrine); Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 209, at
568-72 (stating that modem doctrine is inconsistent with values of constitutional democracy). But see Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH.
L. REV. 481 (1983), (concluding that the doctrine's development results in the redefinition
of property rights to the disadvantage of property owners) [hereinafter Sax, Decline]; Sarah
E. Wilson, Private Property and the Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving the Coastal
Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 57 (1984) (arguing that the concept provides an
innovative basis for assertion of public rights to sustain protective environmental regulations); Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27 (proposing a new way of analyzing just
compensation clause challenges to governmental actions aimed at vindicating public rights
in waters and tidally influenced lands); Johanna Searle, Note, Private Property Rights Yield
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one instance in which an apparent assertion of public trust authority has been declared unconstitutional, 302 an exercise of public trust
authority by a state should not be considered insulated from such
challenges. 303 Since Lucas may invite the use of public trust as a
defense to a takings claim, 304 one can foresee a clash between these
two "competing, dynamic principles of American property law."30S
Courts have commonly given several reasons why exercises of
public trust authority should bar a takings claim and should not be
considered a taking. One reason is that because the state cannot
alienate trust property in favor of private interests,306 private interests must be considered subservient to the dominant public interest
in those lands. 307 Conveyance of trust land to private parties, there-

to the Environmental Crisis: Perspectives on the Public Tntst Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. REV.
897, 910-17 (1990) (discussing clash between public and private property rights as courts
attempt to carve judicial solutions to environmental problems).
302. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (striking down Maine's
intertidal law granting a public general recreational easement where recreational uses did
not exist prior to the enactment of Colonial Ordinance 1641-47 of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony and were not developed as common law right after statehood). See Rieser, Public
Trust, supra note 27, at 6-7. See also Huffman, Public Tnest Doctrine, supra note 209, at
568.
303. See Spalding, Pearl, supra note 202, at 43-45 (1989) (stating that a takings
challenge will not likely survive in the face of state case law showing state's claim to
tidelands or any other property or resources is protected by the public trust doctrine).
304. The wisdom of relying on judicial activism to advance a political agenda may
not necessarily be good for the environment. Berlin, Just Compensation, supra note 13, at
147-50 (arguing that constitutional history indicates that attempts to use the courts to
block progressive social legislation are probably ultimately doomed to failure and can lead
to debilitating complacency). Moreover, the success of these efforts will depend on the
robustness of the doctrine in the given jurisdiction and the willingness of the state court
to defy the clear message of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas to chill regulations that
have as their central goal preserving land in its natural state. See Sax, Understanding
Lucas, supra·note 142, at 1437-38.
305. Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 5.
306. Several courts have held that conveyance of public trust lands to private trust
parties remains subject to the public rights in the property conveyed. See, e.g., San Diego
County Archaeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923 (1978) (holding
that a lagoon remained subject to public trust easement claimed by city and state based
on Mexican grants), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S.
198 (1984) (holding that state's claim to servitude must have been presented in federal
patent proceeding to survive); see also Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979) (holding that title to wharf and granite building
constructed over filled tidelands is subject to public trust obligation that land be used for
public purpose); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash. 1987) (finding that
privately owned tidelands are subject to public trust).
307. See, e.g., Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987) (holding that public
trust doctrine precluded takings claim because title to trust resources was acquired subject
to whatever state action was necessary to protect public's interest in trust resources).
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fore, remains subject to the over-riding public rights in that property.3os
The land in question is not, like ordinary private land held in
fee simple absolute, subject to development at the sole whim of
the owner, but is impressed with a public trust, which gives the
public's representatives an interest and responsibility in its
development. 309

To allow the private owner to displace the dominant state interest
by a takings claim would be the same as saying that the state
cannot protect its interest in those lands.
Another reason commonly given is that since private rights
attached to the trust resources later than the public's rights, which
originated with (or even prior to) sovereignty, private title does not
include the right to affect trust resources adversely. 310 Thus, the
landowner has no title in that land in the first place.311
Because a landowner cannot claim a property right she never
possessed312 or, alternatively, has one that can be rescinded by the
308. See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass.
1981) (finding that no developed western Civilization has recognized absolute rights of
private ownership in public trust land below low water mark as a means of allocating
scarce and precious resources among the competing public demands).
309. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass.
1979).
310. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (holding no private vested rights to affect
trust resources adversely); see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 50
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Warren Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't
of Envtl. Resources, 341 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. Commw. 1975). Conveyances of trust
resources to private parties remain impressed with public trust, People v. California Fish
Co., 138 P. 79, 84 (Cal. 1913) and State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 250 (Cal. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981), and remain subject to the sovereign's retained supervisory
authority. See, e.g., 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 124; Bortz Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 279 A.2d 388, 396 (Pa. 1971), cited in Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note
115, at 655 nn.158-60.
Some commentators suggest that this line of thinking ca11 also be seen in cases
involving submerged lands, in which the courts consistently hold that public rights in trust
resources pre-exist any private property rights in those lands. See Spalding, Pearl, supra
note 202, at 45; Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 38-41. See also Davis, Environmental Statutes, supra note 232, at 384-85 (public trust and takings implications of Florida
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (1986), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1053 (1987),
aif'g in part 8 Ct. Cl. 160 (1985)).
311. The most the landowner has is the equivalent of an easement or usufructuary
interest in the land. Fee title to trust land must remain in the sovereign, since the sovereign
could not divest itself of this interest in the landowner's favor absent a specific legslative
directive to the contrary. See supra part III.B.2.a.
312. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20
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sovereign at any time, the Fifth Amendment provides no shelter
from state action affecting public trust property. It is as though the
private property owner of trust lands is merely a custodian of those
lands for present and future generations, 313 and the state has an
easement over her lands that permanently burdens ownership of
them. 314
Any construct that removes exercises of sovereign authority
from constitutional review has been (and should be) met with
skepticism and concern. 3 15
[A] constitutional democracy is a limited democracy, and it is
the courts' role to be vigilant in imposing those limits. Among
those limits is the fifth amendment's protection of property
rights, a protection of little value if the courts are free to convert
clearly defined easements into vast public rights. 316

This concern may find expression in judicial dogma favoring the
private landowner and rejecting common law doctrine in favor of
a constitutional right. 317 The likelihood of this may increase as the
doctrine moves further from its perceived historic roots. 318
(deciding that since no individual had the right to use her property to create a nuisance,
state was not "taking" anything when it asserted its power to enjoin nuisance-like activity).
313. Professor Sax suggests a usufructuary model of property rights as an analogue
for this conclusion. Under this model, private landowners only have the right to use land
in ways compatible with the community's dependence on the property as a resource. See
Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1452. See also Rose, Environmental Ethics,
supra note 11, at 31 (arguing that concepts of property, especially common property, are
used to derive norms of responsibility and carefulness about shared trust); see also Carol
Kamm, Note, Public Trust, Farmland Protection, and the Connecticllt Environmental
Protection Act: Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 23 CoNN. L.
REv. 811, 823 (1991) (including supporting citations); Austin, Public Trust, supra note
215, at 1005; Forestier v. Johnson, 127 P. 156, 160 (Cal. 1912).
314. Under this view, there can only be a consensual transfer of property to the
government because under both custom and public trust the land is no longer in private
ownership. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 716.
315. See Lazarus,_ Changing_ Concepts, supra note 115, at 705 (arguing that liberal
thought, particularly concern for private autonomy and security, was main impetus behind
framers' inclusion of Just Compensation Clause in Fifth Amendment), 702-06. See also
Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 209, at 569-70 (discussing public trust
doctrine as means of evading fundamental values of Constitution).
316. Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 209, at 534 (footnotes omitted).
317. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356,
367 (Mass. 1979) (stating that public trust concept, with its implication of unbridled
sovereignty, is "difficult to describe in language in complete harmony with the language
of the law ordinarily applied to privately owned property").
318. See Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Resources, 327 N.W.2d 838, 850-51 n.43
(Mich. 1983) (requiring state to compensate private parties in order to extend public access
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Reliance on these doctrines by government regulators to defend against takings claims may also destabilize expectations about
property. To the extent property ownership plays an important role
in promoting individual liberty, providing for political stability, and
encouraging economic prosperity, 319 any doctrine that threatens the
stability of a regimen of private property could be challenged. 320
Frustrating the expectations of landowners could lead to a backlash
not only against the doctrines, but also against the environmental
laws which protect wetlands321 and barrier beaches.
to all recreational waters); Zinn v. State, 334 N.W.2d 67, 71-72 (Wis. 1983) (requiring
compensation to private parties for extension of public trust beyond existing level of lake).
See also In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (Mass. 1974) (finding that
legislation authorizing public access to private beaches takes private property, thereby
requiring compensation), cited in Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 649
n.96.
319. One of the chief advocates of this view of property is.Richard Epstein. See
generally Epstein, Property, supra note 3 (arguing that property should be regarded as
fundamental civil right because of its universality and utility, enabling resources to reach
their highest and best use with minimum of friction).
320. For a contrary view, see J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 239 (1990) (arguing for transformation of property law to achieve environmentally
sustainable land use program).
321. Wetlands regulatory programs are a favorite target of property rights advocates
because they so clearly implicate questions of private rights, public values and fairness.
A takings claim has been raised in more than one-half of the approximately 400 wetlands
regulatory cases decided in the past 30 years. Jon Kusler & Erik J. Meyers, Takings: Is
the Claims Court All Wet?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWS (Envtl. L. Inst.), Nov./Dec. 1990, at
6. In spite of this assault, in the past 10 years, only four wetlands cases could be found
in which a court ordered the state to compensate a landowner. See 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v.
Hudson, 574 F.Supp. 1381 (B.D. Va. 1983) (denying permit to fill 11 acres deprived owner
of all economically viable use of her land); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d
893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (declaring 95% reduction in
property value a taking); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990)
(denying permit for 12.5 acres of 250-acre site entitled property owner to $2.65 million
because private interest in developing wetlands greater than state's interest in preserving
it for wildlife habitat), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Formanek v. United States,
26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (denying permit to fill 99 acres of wetlands on 111-acre site deprived
owner of "highest and best use" of property entitling claimant to $933,921). But see Tabb
Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), aff'd 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(holding owner's losses insufficient because they amounted to no more than a diminution
of value); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) (finding 25% reduction in
property value not a taking because land's remaining value exceeded owner's economic
investment); Bowles v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 443 (1991) (finding no taking because
owner not deprived of any economically viable use of land); Dufau v. United States, 22
Cl. Ct. 156 (1990) (finding 16-month permit processing delay not temporary taking when
action substantially advances legitimate state interest); Cloutier v. United States, 19 Cl.
Ct. 326 (1990) (finding construction of 23-foot wall next to existing 13-foot flood wall
not compensable taking); Deltona Co!P. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (denying permit to fill 10,000 acres of wetlands not
taking because 80% of site still available for development); Jentgen v. United States, 657
F.2d 1210 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (denying permit to fill 80
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IV. INFUSING PUBLIC TRUST AND CUSTOM INTO TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD NOT DESTABILIZE EXPECTATIONS
Under the new rule in Lucas, the existence of a common law
footing for a proscriptive regulation eliminates the constitutional
need to compensate owners of regulated property. It has been argued elsewhere in this Article that the common law doctrines of
custom and public trust provide such a footing. By injecting these
two common law doctrines into takings jurisprudence, Lucas sets
up a conflict between private and public expectational interests in
certain kinds of property. Unless these doctrines accord with commonly held public understandings about property, the conflict could
have a destabilizing effect on the expectations of landowners.322
A central function of the law of property323 is protection of the
prospective landowner's reasonable expectations 324 about the ability

acres of 101.8-acre site where Corps offered to modify permit to fill 20 acres not taking
even though landowner suffered diminution in economic value and frustration of reasonable expectations). Until the recent decision in Loveladies Harbour, Inc. v. United States,
28 F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding proper denominator is acreage affected
by permit denial), taking claims had been withstood upon a showing of reasonable
remaining use of the property. See, e.g., Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334
(1992), aff'd 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
322. South Carolina is one state where there simply should have been no question
about the applicability of the public trust doctrine to barrier beaches had the State Coastal
Council been given an opportunity to raise the doctrine on remand. See State v. Pinckney,
22 S.C. 484 (1884) (using doctrine to quiet title to tidelands); Cape Romain Land &
Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 146 S.E. 434, 436 (1928) (holding as
trust for public purposes title to land below high water mark on tidal, navigable streams
under well-settled rule in state); Heyward v. Farmers Co., 19 S.E. 963 (S.C. 1894) (holding
that state cannot convey trust lands); State v. Fain, 259 S.E.2d 606, 608 (S.C. 1979)
(finding that title to land between high and low water marks remains in state for public's
benefit); Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern, 252 S.E.2d 133, 135 (S.C. 1979) (determining
that tidelands enjoy special status of being held in trust for public purposes); State v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d 716, 719 (S.C. 1986) (finding that issuing permit to
enclose estuarine marsh violates public trust). See also Johanna Searle, Note, Private
Property Rights Yield to the Environmental Crisis: Perspectives on the Public Trust
Doctrine, 41 S.C.L. REv. 897 (1990). See Att'y Gen. Opin., 1975 S.C. AG LEXIS 1142
(September 30, 1975) for a recitation of the provisions of the state's 1885 constitution
establishing the public trust over barrier beaches and tidelands. With regard to the
application of the public trust doctrine to the State's freshwater wetlands, see Carter v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984) (citing Just v. Marinette
County, 1201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972), with approval).
323. Nuisance law is also premised on the reasonable expectation of the quiet
enjoyment of property. See Copart Indus. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y.
1977), quoted in State v. Schenectady Chern., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1983), modified 419 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
324. The majority's use of "existing rules or understandings" as a basis for defining
the spectrum of uses that qualify for protection under the Constitution acts as an analogue
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to acquire, use, and transfer property. 325 The doctrines of custom
and public trust would appear to be at odds with this function
because of their potential, when creatively interpreted, to transfer
title unexpectedly from private to public hands, and thus destabilize expectations. 326
The public trust doctrine helps to harmonize the laws of nature
and the law of property,327 bringing the expectations of landowners
into harmony with the needs of nature by infusing an ecological
perspective into property law. 328 This is beneficial because the laws
of nature are fundamental and irrefutable, unlike the laws of property, which can be changed by legislative or executive fiat. 329
The laws of nature teach us that private property boundaries
have no relationship to the outer edges of an ecological system like
a wetland or a migrating barrier beach. 330 The failure of current

for those expectations. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992).
325. See Epstein, Property, supra note 3. See also Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins, supra
note 7, at 976 (arguing that permanence, stability and certainty are virtues of property
rights system); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185 (1980) (stating that central idea of public trust
doctrine is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectati,ons held in common
without formal recognition such as title) [hereinafter Sax, Historical Shackles].
326. The potential to destabilize expectations might be greater with public trust than
with custom. A customary practice by its very nature puts the landowner on notice of the
public's use of her land. Custom recognizes only long-standing, continuous practices by
localities, and such use must be reasonable. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994) (holding use of dry sand
areas by public so notorious as to create constructive notice that use is not part of bundle
of rights acquired by purchaser). But see Hoff, Public Beach Access, supra note 187
(stating custom places high evidentiary burden on public). See generally supra part III.B.l.
The public trust doctrine, by contrast, does not require actual use by the public, let
alone use continuous beyond the memory of man. See Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra
note 202, at 257 (stating that bald assertion of set of communal interests now recognized
as valuable can diminish private property rights and no compensation need be paid to those
private property owners). Moreover, the doctrine's fluidity, constantly changing circumference, and its anachronistic, esoteric provenance may make the doctrine's use problematic
in any given case. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (holding
private property rights in submerged lands divested in favor of public trust). But see Justice
Brennan's unpublished dissent drafted for Nollan, supra note 241 (arguing that historical
provenance of doctrine and consistent national application is sufficient to deprive coastal
landowner of any reasonable expectation of right to deny public access to ocean).
327. See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 210 (arguing that property law's basic messages
about ownership are misguided insofar as they contradict the laws of nature).
328. See Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra note 147.
329. Hunter advocates having the laws of nature, therefore, inform all of our social
institutions. See Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 316.
330. Fritsch states:
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legal dogma to take into account the laws of nature has significantly threatened the environmental stability of these areas.33t
Creating severable property interests in interrelated natural
systems like surface and groundwater, or dividing single surface
systems into discrete ownership units, like grazing permits, without
considering the impact on the larger ecosystem, is inconsistent
with the laws of nature. 332 "The boundaries that we draw, between,
farm A and ranch B, carry no meaning in nature's terms. No coyote
or egret reads our deeds; no percolating groundwater stops to ask
permission to enter."333 This inconsistency creates a conflict between tpe laws of property and the functions of natural systems,
which has resulted in the destruction of many natural systems. 334
Both public trust and custom can be applied to protect natural
systems like coastal barrier beaches, the inter-tidal zone, or the
tributary system of an inland lake.335 Horizontal or vertical ownership entitlements are irrelevant to the reach of those doctrines. In
that sense, the public trust doctrine comports more closely to how
<

The basic insight of ecology is that all living things exist in interrelated
systems; nothing exists in isolation. The world system is weblike; to pluck
one strand is 'to cause all to vibrate; whatever happens to one part has
rantifications for all the rest. Our actions are not individual but social; they
reverberate throughout the whole ecosystem.
A. FRITSCH, SCIENCE ACTION
CERNED CITIZENS 3-4 (1980),
at 313-14.
.
331. Ecologists sound a
legal and social institutions to

COALITION, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: CHOICES FOR CON·
quoted in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167,
note of urgency in their arguments for the need to reform
better reflect an ecological perspective:

The immediacy of the environmental crisis does not afford us the luxury of
waiting for the rest of mankind to make the radical paradigm shift to a
Spinozistic-Leopoldian ethical posture. For the immediate future, Nature must
be protected from the uncontroverted and the ecologically ignorant by a vast
interlocking system of national and international law.
George Sessions, Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis, HUMBOLDT J. Soc. RBL.
71, 80 (1974), quoted in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 317.
332. Aldo Leopold's land ethic reminds us that "the individual is a member of a
community of interdependent parts[,]" the boundaries of which "include soils, waters,
plants, and animals ...." ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 239 (1966), quoted
in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra.note 167, at 318.
333. Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1279.
334. See Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1278-83 (stating legal property boundaries
are factually wrong and gravely pernicious to extent they separate man from nature).
335. See supra part lli.B.2.a.
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natural systems actually work than do the laws of private property
owner~hip. 336

The doctrinal foundations of both public trust and custom
recognize land as part of a natural system on which we as a society
depend, whether for the shellfish beds that provide a source of food
or for the beaches that serve a socializing or educational purpose. 337
Lands protected by these doctrines perform a communal welfare
function. Both doctrines erect a trust over that land such that the
owner of lands affected by either doctrine holds those lands in
"trust for the rest of Creation."338 Under both custom and public
trust, private property owners share fiduciary responsibility for
their portion of the land to which these doctrines apply. Thus, a
landowner cannot diminish the contribution her land makes to the
public wealth by removing that land from the public trust or from
public access.339 As Freyfogle writes:

an

It is
error to suggest, as the law largely does, that how an
owner treats a part of nature is his business alone. How a person
deals with the land, given the linkages of nature, is public
business, the concern of all Creation.340

J. Peter Byrne sees in the public trust doctrine a way to articulate a fiduciary relationship between present· and future members of a community which receives spiritual and biological vitality
from any undeveloped or agricultural land. 341 He credits the public
trust doctrine with teaching landowners in some jurisdictions that
336. The Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,
481 (1988) recognized the interconnectedness of water-based habitat. See supra note 243.
See also Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972); Just v. Marinette
County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
337. See supra part III.B.2.b.
338. Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1289-90.
339. This thought found legal expression in Just v. Marinette County, in which the
court sustained a local ordinance requiring landowners to get a permit before engaging in
activities in a wetland. 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (holding .that owner of land has
no absolute and unlimited right to change essential nature of his land so as to use it for
a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures rights of others).
See also J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CoNST. COMMENTARY 239, 242 (1990)
(admiring this language for striking the "true green note"). See Hunter, Ecological
Perspective, supra note 167, at 349-57, for a discussion of the significance of Just and its
progeny.
340. Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1281.
341. J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 239, 244-45 (1990).
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if they purchase land in highly desirable areas, such as along the
oceanfront, they will suffer "some loss of tranquility."342
To the extent that the doctrines of public trust and custom have
been informed by the laws of nature, they may prevent the destabilization of public expectations caused by countering the laws of
nature. 343 An example of this occurred in the recent midwestern
floods where the laws of private property, which enabled construction of homes in the flood plain, destruction of wetlands, diking of
rivers, and stream channelization, clashed with the laws of nature
resulting in disastrous loss of buildings and livelihood. 344
To avoid destablizing public expectations, the reasonableness
of any landowner's expectations about her property should depend
upon what public expectations are (1) recognized as being held
within the trust and (2) capable of disappointment should they be
defeated by private action. 345 One purpose of this Article has been
to show that the public has an expectational interest in the ecological integrity of barrier beaches and wetlands. 346 This interest finds
expression in the common law doctrines of public trust and custom,
which in turn are grounded on the inherently public nature of these
properties.347
Unfortunately, public and private expectations are not always
in harmony. A theoretical understanding of the public's superior
interest in this inherently public property348 may founder on the
reality of the landowner's justifiable frustration if results do not
meet the landowner's expectations. A discussion of expectations
necessarily depends upon the factors leading to them. However, the
exact point at which owners can form private expectations about

342. /d. at 248.
343. "For most of the modern era, the technological use of land has operated to end
'the existence of nature."' Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1443.
344. B. Drnmmond Ayres, Jr., St. Louis Wins the Early Rounds As the Mississippi
Does Its Worst, N.Y. nMES, July 19, 1993, at AI, B6.
345. Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 40.
346. See supra notes 128, 131, and 133.
347. Another function of the public trust doctrine, according to Sax, is to avoid the
destabilizing changes brought about by environmental crises, such as the sudden decline
in a species or destruction of a watershed. See Sax, Historical Shackles, supra note 325,
at 188-89.
348. See Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 311-13 (arguing that
the public should have a right in the ecological integrity of land on which survival
depends).

1995]

Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches

65

the right to use property is addressed neither by the Lucas Court
nor by public trust scholars. 349
[T]here comes a point at which courts simply cease to be
sympathetic to owners' claims that their reasonable expectations
are being sharply disappointed. That is, at some point the
imposition of such restraints is no longer seen as sharply
destabilizing for the land-development industry. One might say
the same about the long line of wetland-protection cases. As
such laws become more and more commonplace, wetlands
owners will not be able to claim an expectational right to
develop as they did in the past.350
The difficulty in finding and maintaining that point for the individual landowner is made worse by the changing nature of the public's
expectations about the value of certain property. 351 Nowhere has
this been more true than in the field of environmental law, 352 as
349. A post-Lucas decision by the Court of Federal Claims has fixed the time at
which reasonable investment-backed expectations are created as the time at which the
claimant takes title to her property. Presault v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 69 (1992) (holding
that conversion of railroad right-of-way trail under National Trails System Act did not
effect a taking because owners' reversionary interest in land had long been extinguished).
[G]iven long-standing, pervasive and specific federal limitations on rights
created by state law in respect of property burdened by a private easement for
a public purpose, a landowner could [not] have developed a historically rooted
expectation of compensation for postponement of those rights when state law
does not recognize the rights independent of federal regulation.
ld. at 89.

350. Sax, Historical Shackles, supra note 325, at 188-89 n.13. The courts have
consistently held claimants responsible for knowing about the status of restrictions on the
use of their property. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (stating
that chemical company could not have formed reasonable investment-backed expectation
about the confidentiality of data submitted under statute allowing release of information
to public). See also Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 321 (1991) ("[Where
claimant knew he had to obtain wetlands permits and permits would be difficult to get],
to find that the Federal Government has taken a property interest in the form of a distinct,
reasonable, investment-backed expectation, would, in this instance, turn the Government
into an involuntary guarantor of Ciampitti's gamble:').
351. Even the Lucas Court recognized that landowners "necessarily expect" that
their expectational interests may "be restricted, from time to time, by various measures
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers;' Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct., 2886, 2899 (1992), and that "changed circumstances
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so." ld. at 2900.
352. Lewis Thomas states:
The oldest, easiest-to-swallow idea was that the earth was man's personal
property, a combination of garden, zoo, bank vault, and energy source, placed
at our disposal to be consumed, ornamented, or pulled apart as we wished.
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illustrated by the expanding scope of the public trust doctrine.
Changes in public expectations are brought about by changing
socioeconomic priorities and new information.353 These changes in
public expectations can cause serious dislocations in private expectations.354
It is in the very nature of common law doctrines to expand
and change over time to reflect changing social mores and expectations. The Lucas Court, by relying on common law doctrines to
restrict the circumstances in which government may regulate the
activities of private landowners, hil;S increased somewhat the opportunities for frustrating those landowners' expectations. 355 At the
The bettennent of mankind was, as we understood it, the whole point of the
thing. Mastery over nature, mystery and all, was a moral duty and social
obligation.
In the last few years we were wrenched away from this way of looking at it,
and arrived at something like general agreement that we had it wrong. We still
argue the details, but it is conceded almost everywhere that we are not the
masters of nature that we thought ourselves; we are as dependent on the rest
of life as are the leaves or midges or fish. We are part of the system. One way
to put it is that the earth is a loosely fonned, spherical organism, with all its
working parts linked in symbiosis. We are, in this view, neither owners nor
operators; at best, might see ourselves as motile tissue specialized for receiving infonnation-perhaps, in the best of all possible worlds, functioning as a
nervous system for the whole being.
LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 103-04 (1974).
353. The evolution in the public's attitude toward wetlands is illustrative of this
point. Before enactment of the Clean Water Act, the prevailing attitude was that wetlands
were waste lands. In fact, the historical and institutional preference had been to drain
wetlands and to convert them to a higher societal use. See, e.g., The Swamp Land Act of
1849, ch. 87, 9 Stat. 352; The Swamp Land Act of 1850, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519; The Swamp
Land Act of 1860, ch. 5, 12 Stat. 3 (providing subsidies for the draining of swamps in
several states). Hope Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to Its Ears in
Alligators, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 311 n.20 (1991). Now wetlands, because the
public knows more about their functions and is faced with a growing shortage of them,
are considered among our most valuable natural systems; as a result, they are protected
by a web of prohibitive federal, state, and local laws. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1986)
(wetlands pennitting provisions of the Clean Water Act); 16 U.S.C. § 3901 (1986)
(establishment of National Wetlands Priority Conservation Plan).
354. Determining the reasonableness of a landowner's expectations about her property use rights under these circumstances may be a matter of determining whether she had
notice, at the time she acquired the property, of these common law doctrines as well as
any changes in their scope. See Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 40 (arguing focus
should be on whether legislature, courts, administrative agencies, and public sent signal
to private owners of broader definition of public interest). See also Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (stating property owners were on notice that state had
claimed or could claim ownership interest in submerged tidelands).
355. In his desire to have ecological concerns drive takings jurisprudence, Professor
Hunter expects landowners to understand both that rule changes affecting their property
will act retrospectively and that the marketplace will make adjustments to take care of any
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same time, Lucas has aligned takings jurisprudence more closely
with the public's expectations about inherently public property,
such as wetlands and barrier beaches, and with the laws of nature,
which could exert a stabilizing influence on property law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Lucas, despite its rhetoric and the Cassandra-like cries of its
dissenters, may influence takings jurisprudence less than its authors
intended and early critics feared. Ironically, the Lucas decision
may make it more difficult for takings claimants to successfully
strike down environmental regulations. The doctrines of custom
and public trust could thwart the decision's preference for private
property rights by underscoring the public's superior right to access and use certain resources, but this is not as destabilizing as it
sounds because both common law doctrines are a reflection of
public expectations.
The most significant change Lucas has made in takings jurisprudence is to shift its focus to the states. The content of the new
takings paradigm established in Lucas will be defined by each
state's common law of nuisance and property. 356 This presents a
unique opportunity to merge the laws of ecology with the laws that
govern the use and disposal of property. Even with the possibility
of significant state-to-state variation, one would nevertheless expect common holdings to emerge affirming the need to preserve
critical ecosystems like wetlands and barrier beaches because of
public understandings about the importance of those systems. How
successfully the new common law takings jurisprudence will now
fulfill property owners' expectations about their bundle of rights in
the twentieth century awaits Lucas' state progeny.

unfairness that results. See Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 381
(advocating that anyone investing in real estate should know that certain undeveloped lands
invite special regulation).
356. The extent to which the Court will allow the lower courts to develop background principles of common law freely and to mediate the clash of expectational interests
remains to be seen. At least one scholar worries that their evolution "will be hemmed and
hobbled by federally enforced 'objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents,"'
which in turn might emerge into "a supervening federal law of damnum absque injuria
(loss without injury) to protect private owners' right to engage in harm-producing uses of
land." Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 16.

